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JON BAUER*
Buying Witness Silence:
Evidence-Suppressing Settlements
and Lawyers' Ethics
Lawyers frequently draft settlements that impede other parties'
access to relevant evidence through clauses that prohibit the
plaintiff from disclosing information to anyone with a claim
against the defendant or forbid all discussion of the facts
underlying the dispute. This Article argues that lawyers who
negotiate these "noncooperation" agreements violate Rule 3.4(f)
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits
requesting someone other than the lawyer's own client to withhold
relevant information from another party, and Model Rule 8.4(d),
which prohibits conduct "prejudicial to the administration of
justice."
The conventional wisdom among practitioners and legal ethics
scholars has been that lawyers may ethically negotiate any
settlement. terms that serve their clients' interests and are not
criminal or fraudulent. (Some recent critics of settlement secrecy
have argued that noncooperation settlements violate obstruction
of justice statutes or other criminal laws, but the illegality
argument is largely unconvincing.) This Article argues that the
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thanks to
Leslie Levin, Alexandra Lahav, Peter Siegelman, and Michelle Caldera for their
detailed and helpful comments on earlier drafts; Paul Reingold and Mary
Berkheiser for their collaboration on a role play that fostered a lively discussion at
the 2003 AALS Workshop on Clinical Legal Education; and Stefanie Hennes for
her formidable research assistance and good cheer. I am also grateful for the many
thoughtful comments and questions I received at a University of Connecticut
School of Law faculty workshop and a seminar on settlement sponsored by the
Connecticut Bar Association.
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conventional view has looked at the problem through the wrong
lens. In the ethos of the ethics codes, third party and societal
interests generally take a back seat to client service, but certain
types of conduct deemed especially harmful to the justice system
have long been placed off-limits to lawyers because of their special
role as "officers of the court. "
This Article traces the history of one such duty, the principle
that lawyers must not ask nonclients to refrain from voluntarily
disclosing relevant information to other parties or their attorneys,
and shows the important function that it plays in safeguarding the
integrity of adversary adjudication. After providing a theoretical
justification for liberally construing ethics rules that limit client
advocacy for the sake of the adversary system's effective
functioning, this Article explores what the rules mean for
settlement practices. The Conclusion addresses the critique that
prohibiting lawyers from negotiating agreements that their clients
could lawfully enter into on their own is either futile or
paternalistic, and shows that it is neither.
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INTRODUCTION
It is improper for an attorney ... to influence persons, other
than his clients or their employees, to refuse to give information to
opposing counsel which may be useful or essential to opposing
counsel in establishing the true facts and circumstances affecting
the dispute....
All persons who know anything about the facts in
controversy are, in simple truth, the law's witnesses.
Defendants should not be able to buy the silence of witnesses
with a settlement agreement when the facts of one controversy are
relevant to another.2
F elicia Martinez (not her real name) worked as a machine
operator in a factory. She and several Latina co-workers
were bilingual and frequently conversed in Spanish. After some
other employees complained, the shift supervisor ordered the
workers in his department to speak only English. Ms. Martinez
tried to comply, but often found herself unconsciously slipping
into her native language. The supervisor repeatedly warned her
that she was violating his directive. Ms. Martinez became
1 ABA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935).
2 Wendt v. Walden Univ., Inc., No. 4-95-467, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720, at *5
(D. Minn. Jan. 16, 1996).
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particularly upset when he rebuked her for using Spanish while
teaching a new employee, who barely understood any English,
how to run a machine. She told the supervisor that his rule was
unnecessary and unfair. He told her to just be quiet and follow
instructions. Shortly thereafter, he notified her that she was
being laid off due to a lack of work, although a new machine
operator had been hired into the department just a few days
earlier.
Ms. Martinez sought help from the law school clinical
program where I teach. The clinic filed a complaint on her
behalf, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her
based on national origin and retaliated against her based on her
expression of opposition to discriminatory practices in violation
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.3  Three years of
litigation ensued, first in a state antidiscrimination agency and
then in federal court. After extensive discovery, the defendant's
attorneys expressed interest in settlement. The negotiations
initially focused on money. When a sum was agreed on, the
defense lawyers drafted a proposed settlement agreement. It
included a provision requiring the plaintiff to keep the
settlement amount confidential and another clause that read:
"Martinez will not . . . assist any person who files a lawsuit,
charge, claim or complaint against [the defendant] unless
Martinez is required to render such assistance pursuant to a
lawful subpoena or other legal obligation."
Incentives for compliance were built into the agreement. Part
of the settlement would be paid upon signing, with the
remainder to be paid six months later-but only if she abided by
the confidentiality terms during that time. The company could
also recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to half the
total settlement sum if Ms. Martinez breached the secrecy or
noncooperation clauses. To avoid disclosing the terms of the
agreement in public court records, the agreement took the form
of a private contract; upon its execution, the parties would file
with the court a stipulation stating that the matter was
voluntarily withdrawn.
3 See generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 1689, 1726-38 (2006) (discussing the history and mixed success of
Title VII challenges to English-only policies).
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The students who handled the case presented the proposed
settlement to our client with client-centered neutrality.4 They
explained the proposal and discussed alternatives, including
going to trial or attempting further negotiations, elicited her
reactions and concerns, spoke of pros and cons, but did not
advise her what to do. Ms. Martinez expressed mixed emotions.
She felt exhausted and wanted the case to be over. She was
happy with the size of the settlement, but felt bad about not
officially "winning" and establishing that the company did
something wrong. She was comfortable keeping the settlement
amount confidential; in fact, she wanted to make sure her friends
and neighbors did not learn how much money she was getting-
because if they did, they would probably want some. The
noncooperation provision gave her pause. She believed that
other employees at the company had faced similar
discrimination, and if they brought claims, she wanted to be able
to help them, just as some of her former co-workers had helped
her. Nonetheless, she decided that, on balance, she could accept
the restriction. After all, she could still testify if subpoenaed.
She did not want to risk delaying the settlement by fighting over
it.
So, the settlement was concluded. A few months later, Ms.
Martinez called me, very upset. She had been contacted by an
attorney representing a Latina woman recently fired by the
company, someone she knew and liked. The attorney said that
he was considering filing a discrimination complaint and wanted
to know about any discrimination that Ms. Martinez had seen or
experienced. She had to tell him that she couldn't tell him
anything. She asked me if I could call the attorney and give him
the information. However, I explained that doing so would put
her settlement at risk. She felt terrible about not being able to
help her friend.
In retrospect, I wondered whether we had acceded too readily
to the defense lawyers' insistence on nonassistance. Our client's
lawsuit had been about her right to speak out against perceived
discrimination, and it was painfully ironic that the settlement was
4 See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 2-13, 270-98 (2d ed.
2004) (describing the hallmarks of a client-centered approach to counseling that
posits that lawyers generally should maintain a neutral stance toward important
case decisions and assist the client in reaching a decision that accords with the
client's values, priorities, and tolerance for risk).
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now silencing her on the same subject. Even more troubling was
the possibility that the agreement was interfering with another
person's ability to prove discrimination. I never found out what
became of the co-worker's claim. The attorney may have
concluded that without my client's evidence, he did not have
enough to justify investing time, expense, and effort into a case
where payment would be contingent on success. If he did take
on the case, the agreement would increase his client's litigation
costs; a deposition would be required to obtain information that,
absent the agreement, would have been available for free by
simply interviewing Ms. Martinez and having her sign a witness
statement.
The agreement's effects would also be felt if the co-worker's
claims were investigated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or a state antidiscrimination agency.5 It would bar
Ms. Martinez from responding to inquiries by an agency
investigator, and the absence of her corroborating evidence
might mean the difference between dismissal of the co-worker's
claim and a favorable finding. The silence mandated by the
settlement agreement may have obstructed a tribunal's fact-
finding or prevented a meritorious claim from being filed in the
first place. At a minimum, it made it significantly more
expensive for another litigant to get at the facts.
Lawyers frequently negotiate settlements that suppress
evidence in the manner that Ms. Martinez's story illustrates.
Sometimes this is done through agreements that expressly
prohibit information-sharing with other litigants. Often, the
same result is accomplished by settlement clauses that prohibit
disclosure, to anyone, of the facts underlying the dispute. In this
Article, the term "noncooperation" refers to all forms of
settlement secrecy that effectively prohibit a settling plaintiff
from disclosing relevant information to others with current or
future claims against the same defendant.
This Article makes the case that attorneys who negotiate
noncooperation settlements act in violation of their ethical
responsibilities under binding disciplinary rules. Rule 3.4(f) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules" or
5 An administrative complaint is a prerequisite to filing suit under Title VII, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2008), and is the only realistic option for litigants not
represented by counsel.
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"Rules") prohibits a lawyer from requesting any person, other
than the lawyer's client or the client's relatives or employees, to
refrain from voluntarily providing relevant information to
another party.6  Lawyers who make settlement offers
conditioned on noncooperation are doing precisely what the rule
prohibits. A strong case can also be made that lawyers who ask
for noncooperation, or accept a noncooperation settlement
proposed by the other side, violate Model Rule 8.4(d), which
prohibits attorneys from engaging in "conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice., 7
The requirement that lawyers not seek to induce witnesses to
withhold voluntary cooperation, though of longstanding vintage
(it dates back at least to the 1935 ethics opinion quoted at the
start of this Article), remains one of the least well-known of
lawyers' ethical duties. I was unaware of the rule for most of my
first decade or so in practice, and many lawyers I've spoken with
either have never heard of it or never thought about its
implications for settlement agreements. Leading law school
ethics texts contain no discussion of Rule 3.4(f) or give it only
passing mention.8  Its application to settlement secrecy has
received very little attention. The issue was briefly addressed in
one state ethics advisory opinion, which concluded that a
settlement offer conditioned on noncooperation violates Rule
3.4(f). 9  Stephen Gillers, in an article contending that
6 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008).
7 Id. R. 8.4(d). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"),
which still forms the basis for the ethical rules in two jurisdictions, contains no
direct equivalent to Model Rule 3.4(f) but does include the "conduct prejudicial"
rule. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981).
8 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS (3d ed. 2004); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
ETHICS (4th ed. 2004); RICHARD ZITRIN ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW (3d ed. 2007). The most comprehensive current ethics treatise focuses
nearly all of its discussion of Rule 3.4(f) on how it permits lawyers to advise clients
and clients' employees not to cooperate with an adversary, while paying scant
attention to what the rule prohibits. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 30.12 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008).
9 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993); see also Jon Bauer,
Settlement Provisions Restricting the Plaintiffs Right to Voluntarily Provide Relevant
Information to Others Suing the Same Company May Violate Rule 3.4(f) of the
Model Rules, EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE (National Employment Lawyers
Association), Summer 1995, at 158; Laurie Kratky Dor6, Settlement, Secrecy, and
Judicial Discretion: South Carolina's New Rules Governing the Sealing of
2008]
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noncooperation settlements violate federal criminal laws on
obstruction of justice, noted that Rule 3.4(f) appears to bar
lawyers from making such requests. 10  Professor Gillers,
however, gave the rule only passing mention, and other
commentators (again with little analysis) have questioned the
rule's application to settlements.11
In explaining why the ethics rules should be read to prohibit
some very common settlement practices, this Article focuses
attention on the largely forgotten history and purposes of the
principle that it is unethical and prejudicial to the administration
of justice for a lawyer to influence a witness to refrain from
disclosing relevant information to an adverse party. It also
explores the implications of this ethical proscription for the
practice of settlement, examining the specific sorts of settlement
terms that the rules should be construed to place off-limits or
allow.
Part I discusses the varieties and prevalence of
noncooperation settlements, and situates the issue within the
broader public policy debates that have surrounded settlement
secrecy. Part II considers the standard view of the ethics of
settlement secrecy that has informed practitioners' thinking and
most of the legal ethics literature, which frames the issue as a
conflict between client interests and the protection of third
parties from harm, in which the former takes precedence. The
perception that lawyers' "hands are tied," that they must accept
and abide by the client's decisions concerning secrecy, has
produced widespread discomfort, particularly in the plaintiffs'
bar. Recent changes to the Model Rules somewhat broaden the
scope of the harm-prevention exceptions to the lawyer's
confidentiality duty, but I conclude that these changes will have
little impact." Arguments have also been made that
noncooperation agreements and other forms of settlement
Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 815 n.142 (2004) (noting that such settlements may
raise ethical issues under Rule 3.4(f)).
10 Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned on
Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15 (2002).
11 See Joel Cohen & James L. Bernard, Buying Victim Silence, 231 N.Y. L.J., Jul.
28, 2004, at 4 n.5 (suggesting that Professor Gillers's "reading of the rule may be
broader than its text supports").
12 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)-(3) (2008); see also infra
text accompanying notes 67-74.
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secrecy run afoul of criminal statutes concerning obstruction of
justice or compounding. 13 I conclude that the illegality argument
is largely unconvincing, and is unlikely to make much headway
with prosecutors or deter lawyers from negotiating
noncooperation settlements.
14
If lawyers generally must abide by lawful client decisions,
regardless of harm to third parties, there is another strand in
lawyers' ethical codes, rooted in the lawyer's role as an "officer
of the court," that makes it impermissible to participate in
certain actions deemed especially harmful to the justice system,
regardless of the client's desires. Part III traces the development
and underlying rationales of one such duty, the principle that it is
improper for attorneys to impede voluntary witness disclosures
to opposing parties. It derives from American Bar Association
("ABA") ethical pronouncements dating back to the 1920s, and
was deliberately carried forward into the modern disciplinary
codes. The principle rests on a vision of adversary adjudication
as a means for uncovering truth and resolving disputes fairly,
and is intended to further the integrity, accuracy, and efficiency
of that process. Several lines of judicial precedent, addressing
the enforceability of noncooperation contracts and other issues,
similarly articulate the idea that interference with an adversary's
access to ex parte witness interviews is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Part IV turns to what the rules mean for settlement secrecy. I
start with some general interpretive principles, since much
depends on how broad or narrow a construction is given to
ambiguous rule language. I argue that limitations on advocacy
that are designed to set ground rules of fair competition needed
to ensure the adversary system's effective functioning, of which
the rule against noncooperation requests is one example, should
be construed liberally to achieve their goals.
15
13 See John P. Freeman, The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55
S.C. L. REV. 829 (2004); Gillers, supra note 10; Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to
Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in
Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783 (2002).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 79-84 and Appendix.
15 This discussion builds on the insights of an important but little-known essay by
Robert Kutak, who chaired the commission that drafted the Model Rules,
concerning the "competitive theory" that underlies the Rules' approach to ethical
regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 220-29.
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The remainder of Part IV addresses a number of specific
interpretive issues that arise in applying the ethics rules to
noncooperation settlements. I conclude that, both as a matter of
plain meaning and regulatory purpose, no exemption for
settlements can be read into Rule 3.4(f). And while that rule by
its terms applies only to the requesting lawyer, Model Rule 8.4
requires plaintiffs' lawyers to say "no" to such requests rather
than agree to settlement terms that are prejudicial to the
administration of justice. I also examine the meaning of the
phrase "another party" in Rule 3.4(f), which determines to
whom disclosures must be allowed, and the scope of the
exception in the rule that allows noncooperation requests to be
made to a client's employees. Finally, I consider the extent to
which it is permissible to require that certain types of
information, including settlement amounts, discovery materials,
privileged information, and trade secrets, not be disclosed, or to
restrict the manner in which disclosures may be made.
In the Conclusion, I consider some objections to using the
existing legal ethics rules to restrict lawyer participation in
noncooperation settlements. Questions may be raised about the
efficacy and appropriateness of barring lawyers from negotiating
agreements that clients could lawfully enter into on their own. I
explain why, despite possibilities of evasion, targeting lawyer
involvement is likely to be reasonably effective in deterring
settlement practices that harm the justice system, and why
objections founded on client autonomy are unconvincing.
Lawyers' special responsibilities to the administration of justice
warrants forbidding attorney involvement in conduct that
undermines the integrity of adversary adjudication, regardless of
whether other law forbids it.
I
NONCOOPERATION AGREEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
SECRET SETTLEMENTS CONTROVERSY
Settlement agreements that prohibit a settling party from
voluntarily providing evidence in other proceedings appear to be
common. Just how common is hard to determine, since the
parties covenant to keep the existence and terms of the
agreement confidential as well. There is ample anecdotal
evidence that defendants routinely insist on confidentiality
[Vol. 87, 481
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clauses that forbid disclosure of the settlement terms.16  An
unknown, but undoubtedly significant, proportion of settlements
also prohibit disclosures of factual information relating to the
lawsuit. Defendants have strong incentives to seek such
restrictions in order to avoid adverse publicity, decrease the
chances of similar suits being filed, and make it more difficult for
those who bring claims to prove their cases. Plaintiffs and their
lawyers who believe that they can obtain a larger payment in
exchange for promises of secrecy have incentive to agree.
Secrecy clauses that bar disclosures to other litigants can take
several forms. Overt noncooperation clauses, such as the one in
Ms. Martinez's settlement, directly prohibit the voluntary
disclosure of information to others bringing claims against a
settling defendant.' 7  Broader confidentiality provisions that
prohibit discussion of the underlying facts or subject matter of
the claim,18 making "disparaging" statements about the other
16 See Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 675-76 (2001)
(finding, based on interviews with attorneys for corporate defendants and insurance
companies, that most attorneys insist on secrecy provisions in settlement
agreements); Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of
Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111,
113 n.4 (2007) (citing an estimate given by a federal magistrate judge that eighty-
five percent to ninety percent of employment discrimination settlements are
governed by confidentiality agreements); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 511 (1994) (noting, based on attorneys'
reports and Judge Weinstein's "own experience in helping to settle thousands of
cases," that "it is almost impossible to settle many mass tort cases without a secrecy
agreement").
17 See, e.g., Dillard v. Starcon Int'l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2007)
(discussing draft settlement in employment discrimination case that prohibited
plaintiff from assisting in future investigations of defendant). Another example is
Michael Jackson's once-secret settlement with a minor who had accused him of
sexual battery, which contained a clause prohibiting uncompelled disclosures to
anyone bringing a civil claim against Jackson. Confidential Settlement Agreement
and Mutual General Release at I 10(f), Chandler v. Jackson, Case No. SC026226
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Jan. 25, 1994), available at http://www.thesmokinggun
.comlgraphicslart3/0616041jackol4.gif.
18 See, e.g., Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300, 1300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting settlement agreement that barred the plaintiff or her attorneys from
responding "in any way to any inquiry of any kind whatsoever with regard to the
facts surrounding the case/claim"); Barry Siegel, Dilemmas of Settling in Secret:
Companies Offer Hefty Sums in Exchange for Keeping the Details of Public Hazard
Lawsuits Quiet, Plaintiffs Must Choose Their Own Interest or the Public Good, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al (discussing widespread use of such clauses).
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party,'9 or disclosing any facts relating to the plaintiff's
employment with the defendant 20 will have the same effect,
unless they carve out an exception for disclosures of relevant
21information to other litigants-which they seldom do.
Settlement provisions that require the return, destruction, or
nondisclosure of information obtained in discovery can also
prevent a party or party's attorney from furnishing evidence to
22litigants in other cases.
The facts underlying a settled case are often relevant to other
claims involving similar conduct by the same defendant, and may
be highly probative. The Federal Rules of Evidence express a
general principle that prior bad acts are inadmissible to prove
"the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith., 23  However, the exceptions, which allow such
evidence to be admitted for a wide variety of other purposes
(including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, or
propensity to engage in sexual abuse),24 tend to swallow the rule.
In fraud, discrimination, sex abuse, products liability, and
19 See, e.g., EEOC v. Severn Trent Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 2004)
(noting that such clauses "appear to be fairly common"); Hamad v. Graphic Arts
Ctr., Inc., No. CIV 96-216-FR, 1997 WL 12955, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 1997)
(settlement prohibited plaintiff from "doing or saying anything which disparages or
derogates" the defendant).
20 See, e.g., McKnight v. Stein Mart, Inc., No. 95-0258, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12581, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 22,1996); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363,365 (D.
Nev. 1993).
21 Confidentiality clauses in settlements frequently contain an exception for
disclosures required by subpoena or court order. Sometimes even this is lacking.
See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 456 (N.D.N.Y.
1999); Hamad, 1997 WL 12955, at *1.
22 See ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., RESOLUTION ON PROTECTIVE
ORDERS (May 6, 1989), reprinted in James E. Rooks, Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is
the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, at 876 (2004) [hereinafter ATLA
RESOLUTION] (stating that. defendants in personal injury actions frequently
demand, as a condition of settlement, secrecy agreements that, inter alia, require the
return or destruction of discovery materials and prohibit the dissemination of
information contained in pleadings and discovery); Judith Resnik, Uncovering,
Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes
Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 555-56 (2006) (noting that there is
anecdotal evidence that settlements are routinely predicated on maintaining the
confidentiality of discovery materials); Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly,
Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2001) (stating that
settlement secrecy agreements barring disclosure of discovery information are
commonplace in sexual harassment, defamation, employment, and mass tort cases).
23 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
24 Id. 404(b) & 413-15; Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,685-88 (1988).
[Vol. 87, 481
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environmental tort cases, information relating to similar past
misconduct or complaints is routinely held by courts to be
potentially admissible and within the scope of discovery.2 5 The
plaintiff who settles one case is frequently a potential witness in
another.
A debate about settlement secrecy has raged on and off for
the past two decades, fueled by media reports that serious
environmental, safety, and health risks were kept hidden from
public view by confidential settlements, sealed court files, and
26protective orders. The discourse among academics,
practitioners, and policy makers has largely focused on two
issues: whether and under what circumstances courts, as public
institutions, should be a party to secrecy agreements;2 7 and
25 See, e.g., Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 149-56 (3d Cir. 2002)
(discussing standards for admitting evidence of similar past conduct in civil cases for
sexual assault or child molestation); Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95,
111 (3d Cir. 1999) (in employment discrimination case, evidence of other acts of
harassment "extremely probative" on issues of discriminatory intent, employer's
knowledge, and effectiveness of response); Orjias v. Stevenson, 31 F.3d 995, 999-
1002 (10th Cir. 1994) (evidence of defendant's prior air pollution violations
admissible to show that defendant opened plant with knowledge that it could not
comply with air quality regulations with its existing technology); Hessen v. Jaguar
Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641, 650 (11th Cir. 1990) (evidence of similar occurrences
admissible in products liability action for a variety of purposes, including to show a
lack of safety for intended uses, notice to the defendant of a defect or danger, and
causation); Channelmark Corp. v. Destination Prods. Int'l, Inc., No. 99 C 214, 2000
WL 968818, at *2--*3(N.D. II1. July 7, 2000) (prior similar acts relevant to intent in a
fraud case).
26 The scandals have included sexual abuse by Catholic priests,
Bridgestone/Firestone tires failing on Ford SUVs, health risks from the Dalkon
Shield and silicone breast implants, exploding fuel tanks on GM pickup trucks, and
hazardous chemical spills. See, e.g., Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You
Don't Know Can Kill You!, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 237, 258-63 (summarizing
several of these controversies); see also Daniel J. Givelber & Anthony Robbins,
Public Health Versus Court-Sponsored Secrecy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 2006, at 131, 134 (discussing how A.H. Robins hid the safety risks of the
Dalkon Shield with secret settlements while continuing to market the product);
Koniak, supra note 13, at 783-85 (discussing how secrecy agreements delayed the
recall of Firestone tires for years, resulting in deaths); Matt Carroll et al., Scores of
Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public
Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al (discussing how the Archdiocese of
Boston used secrecy clauses in settling child molestation claims against at least
seventy priests over a decade); Benjamin Weiser, Forging a "Covenant of Silence":
Secret Settlement Shrouds Health Impact of Xerox Plant Leak, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 1989, at Al.
27 The battle lines have been drawn between secrecy advocates, who see courts as
dispute-resolution mechanisms and favor giving judges broad leeway to enter and
enforce secrecy orders to make litigation more efficient and promote settlement,
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whether secrecy provisions that suppress information about
health or safety dangers should be outlawed.28
The antisecrecy arguments have led to some reforms. Several
states have enacted "sunshine in litigation" laws that limit the
ability of judges to enter secrecy orders and declare out-of-court
settlements that conceal health or safety hazards to be contrary
to public policy and unenforceable. 29 The federal district court
in South Carolina has adopted a rule prohibiting the sealing of
settlement agreements filed with the court.3° More generally,
there has been an evolution in the judicial stance toward court-
ordered secrecy. Courts have intensified their scrutiny of
stipulated protective orders and sealing requests, placing greaterS 31
weight on the public interest in access to information. Judicial
involvement in agreements that impede other litigants' access to
relevant information has also fallen into disfavor. Judges
increasingly insist that protective orders provide for discovery
and confidentiality critics, who view adjudication as a "public good" and argue that
the public has a right of access to information generated by court processes, and
that judges have a responsibility to scrutinize parties' secrecy agreements to ensure
that public interests are protected. See generally Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by
Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999) (discussing both sides of the debate and
advocating a balancing approach).
28 See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be
Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883 (2004) (arguing that statutes, court rules, and
professional ethics rules should be strengthened to prevent settlements that bar
disclosure of information concerning dangers to public health or safety); Richard A.
Epstein, The Disclosure Dilemma, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at D1 (arguing
that restrictions on settlement confidentiality will be ineffective in promoting public
safety).
29 Statutes or court rules to this effect have been enacted in Texas, Florida,
Louisiana, Washington, and Arkansas. For descriptions of the state laws and
discussion of their limited effectiveness, see Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and
Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated
Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 394-400, 417-33 (2006); see also
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (West Supp. 2008). Even in the absence of
legislation, some courts have refused to enforce agreements that hide information
about health or safety risks, deeming them contrary to public policy. See, e.g., C.R.
v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
30 D.S.C. Local R. 5.03(E). See generally Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy, 55
S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004) (articles discussing the South Carolina rule).
31 See, e.g., Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d
943 (7th Cir. 1999); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994);
Gleba v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 98-230, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 364 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2001).
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32
sharing with plaintiffs in similar cases and refuse to enforce
private noncooperation agreements when they interfere with
discovery or informal investigation in another proceeding.33
None of these reforms prevent lawyers from negotiating
noncooperation agreements that are effective in achieving their
ends. Having the settlement take the form of a private, out-of-
court contract obviates the need for judicial approval.34  The
prospect that a noncooperation agreement will be found
unenforceable if challenged by a third party seeking information
does not prevent settling parties from entering into one. The
agreement can be structured to give the plaintiff ample incentive
to comply by making future payments contingent on continued
silence, or by creating the risk that if a court does find the
agreement valid, the plaintiff who breached will be liable for
liquidated damages or attorney's fees.36 As Ms. Martinez's case
32 See, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th
Cir. 2003); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); see
generally Dor6, supra note 9, at 812-13; Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil
Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 92-93 (2000);
Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
457,493-500.
33 See infra text accompanying notes 185-203.
34 See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
presumption of public access to judicial proceedings does not extend to settlement
agreements embodied in private contracts, where only a stipulation of dismissal has
been filed with the court); Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order
of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711,
732 (2004) (explaining that the South Carolina district court rule against sealed
settlements is designed to address "court involvement in the business of enforcing
secrecy" and does nothing to prohibit "bilateral secrecy covenants between the
litigants").
35 Cf Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of
Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 344 (1998) (noting that regulation through
contract law will not prevent private parties from pressuring others to agree to
silence, but will deprive them of a court's assistance in enforcing such promises). In
addition, the state "sunshine laws" that declare agreements concealing health or
safety hazards to be void and unenforceable, see supra note 29, generally will have
no effect on secret settlements in many types of litigation in which they are
common, such as employment discrimination and fraud.
36 In a column in the New York Law Journal, two big firm lawyers advised that,
"because enforceability of a confidentiality agreement may be 'problematic' on
public policy grounds, it should contain, if deemed appropriate, a liquidated
damages provision, a staggered payment schedule, or both, to diminish the
likelihood of an unwanted disclosure." Joel Cohen & Joseph Strauss,.
Confidentiality Agreements and Crime, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 2002, at 4; see also
Koniak, supra note 13, at 805 (noting that parties can easily work around
unenforceability by providing for payments over time). Ms. Martinez's settlement
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illustrates, even without judicial enforcement, such agreements
can prevent relevant evidence from reaching other litigants. As
a result, valid claims may never be brought or will be rendered
harder to prove. Even when they do not succeed in suppressing
evidence entirely, noncooperation settlements impose the
substantial costs of taking a deposition, or obtaining a judicial
ruling, on parties who otherwise would have been able to obtain
relevant information informally, and at minimal expense, from a
• 37
willing witness.
II
THE STANDARD VIEW AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Can an attorney ethically demand, or agree to, a settlement
conditioned on noncooperation in other proceedings? The
question has generally been examined only as a part of the
broader question of whether lawyers can ethically agree to
secrecy concerning the settlement terms and underlying facts of
the case. 38 The standard response to that question is concisely
summarized by the authors of a treatise on litigation ethics:
"Zealous advocacy" may require that the defense lawyer
request confidentiality, and the client's interests may mandate
that the plaintiff's lawyer accept [it] to obtain a favorable
settlement.
[I]t seems clear as a matter of legal ethics that the
lawyer's paramount obligation is to the client. . . . [T]he
ultimate decision to participate or not to participate in a
settlement coupled with a "gag order" is the client's. 39
The underlying assumption is that as long as it is legal for the
client to agree to secrecy, it is not unethical for a lawyer to assist
included both a liquidated damages provision and staggered payments. See supra
text accompanying notes 3-4.
37 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 115 (discussing the importance of
informal witness interviews because of "the considerable expense of formal
discovery, which can be prohibitive for many plaintiffs").
38 The major exception is Gillers, supra note 10.
39 WILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK 580 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, U.S.
District Court Judge Jack Weinstein observed, "Since the ethical rules require that
attorneys obtain a swift and optimal recovery for their clients, the plaintiffs'
attorney seems to have little choice but to accept a favorable settlement offer on
secrecy terms." Weinstein, supra note 16, at 511.
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the client in accomplishing her lawful objectives. The ethics
rules' animating principles of loyalty, zeal,40 and client autonomy
require abiding by the client's decision, even if it imposes costs
or injustice on third parties. 1
The basis for the standard view is readily apparent from the
ethics codes' key provisions relating to client decision making
and settlement. Model Rule 1.2 requires the lawyer to "abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation"
and "whether to settle a matter., 42 These obligations are subject
to an outer limitation: the lawyer must not counsel or assist the
client in "conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, 43 or take actions on behalf of the client that "will
result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law."4 The only ethics rule that explicitly rules out settlement
terms that may be desired by a client is Rule 5.6(b), which
40 A lawyer's obligation to "represent [a] client zealously within the bounds of the
law" was the mantra of the Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1, EC 7-19, DR 7-101 (1981). The disciplinary
provisions of the Model Rules articulate blander and weaker-sounding duties of
"competence" and "reasonable diligence," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.1, 1.3 (2008), but the preamble and commentary make it clear that "the basic
principles underlying the Rules . . . include the lawyer's obligation zealously to
protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law." Id.
pmbl. para. 9; see also id. pmbl. para. 2 & R. 1.3 cmt. 1; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra
note 8, at 71 (noting that zealous advocacy remains a "pervasive ethic" under the
Model Rules).
41 See Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 22, at 19 (noting, with respect to
settlement secrecy, that "[u]nder the existing ethical scheme the plaintiff attorney's
duty of loyalty requires putting the client's interests ahead of all others.... [T]he
plaintiff's attorney has no affirmative ethical obligation to consider the interests of
third parties or the general public"); cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4
cmt. 1 (2008) ("Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the
interests of others to those of the client," so long as the legally protected rights of
third persons are not violated.); Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the
State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1395-96 & n.24 (1992) (describing the idea that a
lawyer should do everything possible within the law to further the client's cause,
"no matter what moral wrongs are perpetrated on others in the process," as "a
classic formulation of the legal profession's ethos").
42 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2008); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1981).-
43 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008). Similarly, under the
Model Code, it is impermissible for a lawyer to "[c]ounsel or assist his client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981).
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2008); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(8) (1981).
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forbids a lawyer from participating in the offering or making of a
settlement agreement that restricts the lawyer's right to
practice . In addition, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality,
contained in Rule 1.6, requires, with narrow exceptions, that the
lawyer not reveal any information relating to the representation
46
unless authorized to do so by the client. Based on these
provisions, ABA and state ethics opinions, and most
commentators, have concluded that it is ethically permissible for
lawyers to agree to keep the underlying facts of a case
confidential as part of a settlement.47
Lawyers who represent defendants in civil litigation tend to
endorse the view that they are, and should be, free to negotiate
48
any lawful settlement terms that will benefit their clients.
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2008). Model Rule 5.6(b) and
the nearly identical Model Code provision, DR 2-108(b), clearly prohibit settlement
clauses that bar the plaintiff's lawyer from representing future clients in suits against
the same defendant. The ABA's and several states' ethics committees have
construed the rule to also prohibit settlements that would bar a lawyer from using
(as opposed to disclosing) information obtained during a representation. Thus, a
lawyer could not be prevented from making use of the knowledge gained in one
case as a basis for deciding what records or witnesses to subpoena in future cases
against the same defendant. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 00-417 (2000); Bd. of Prof'l Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal
Ethics Op. 98-F-141 (1998); Colo. Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Ethics Op. 92 (1993).
Agreements that would prevent a lawyer from disclosing information about the
defendant that is a matter of public record have also been found to be
impermissible practice restrictions. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 335
(2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 730 (2000). All of
these opinions take the view that settlements barring disclosure of nonpublic facts
learned in the course of representing a client are permissible under Rule 5.6(b).
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981).
47 See ethics opinions cited supra note 45; see also N.C. State Bar, 2003 Formal
Ethics Op. 9 (2004); SECTION OF LITIGATION, AM. BAR ASS'N, ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS § 4.2.6 (2002); Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 427, 489-90 (1991); Joel S. Newman, Gagging on the Public Interest, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 371, 372-73 (1990); Anne-Thbr~se Bdchamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-
Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 117, 155 (1990); Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave, Current
Development, A Plaintiffs Lawyer's Dilemma: The Ethics of Entering a
Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 825-26 (2003). But see Alan
F. Blakley, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: Ethical Obligations of Officers of the Court
in Possession ofInformation of Public Interest, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 65 (2003) (arguing
that attorneys' general duties as officers of the court sometimes require them to
make disclosure in the public interest).
48 The argument for client autonomy is usually coupled with a substantive
defense of settlement secrecy as way to protect legitimate privacy, business, and
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Some plaintiffs' attorneys likewise have no qualms about making
secrecy "an item for barter on the road to resolution,"4 9 using it
as leverage to gain larger recoveries for their clients and bigger
contingent fees for themselves. But many in the plaintiffs' bar
have strong misgivings about the public harms caused by secret
settlements. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
("ATLA") has issued a resolution denouncing secrecy
agreements that bar disclosure of discovery materials and the
underlying facts of settled cases as detrimental to public health
and safety, the proper functioning of the civil justice system, and
the interests of individual victims. 50 ATLA encourages attorneys
to refuse to enter into secrecy agreements. 51 Civil rights and
public interest lawyers have also expressed concern that
agreements requiring that the terms of settlement be kept
confidential undermine the public and deterrent purposes of
enforcement efforts.5 2
The standard view of the ethics rules, however, leaves lawyers
who would like to "just say no" to secrecy agreements with little
room to maneuver. In their book The Moral Compass of the
American Lawyer, Richard Zitrin and Carol Langford describe
the dilemma faced by a products liability lawyer representing a
widow in a wrongful death suit against the manufacturer of her
deceased husband's implanted heart valve.53  When the
plaintiff's discovery yielded documents proving that the
defendant knew about dangerous design flaws in its product, the
reputational interests, and to help deter frivolous lawsuits. See, e.g., Stephen E.
Darling, Confidential Settlements: The Defense Perspective, 55 S.C. L. REV. 785
(2004); Epstein, supra note 28. But see ZITRIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 569 (stating
that many in-house counsel and defense lawyers wish they could refuse to help
clients hide the truth about safety dangers).
49 Joseph A. Golden, Secrecy Clauses, A Negotiated Restraint on Free Speech, 73
MICH. B.J. 550, 550 (1994). Golden, a plaintiffs' employment lawyer, writes, "A
desire to 'teach the company a lesson' or 'make an example of it' has made for
difficult negotiations, not between the parties, but between plaintiff and plaintiff's
counsel." Id. at 551.
SO ATLA RESOLUTION, supra note 22, at 876. In 2006, ATLA changed its name
to the American Association for Justice.
51 See id. at 877.
52 See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 927 (2006); Newman, supra note 47, at 372.
53 See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF
THE AMERICAN LAWYER 183-85, 205-08 (1999). The account is a composite based
on actual situations that the authors encountered in their legal ethics consulting
practices. See id. at 4.
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defendant's lawyer offered a settlement significantly larger than
what the plaintiff would be likely to recover at trial, contingent
on strict secrecy and the return of all discovery documents. The
plaintiff's lawyer agonized about how to present this offer to her
client. She was concerned that others could die if the heart
valve's dangers were not exposed, but was also aware of "the
guiding principle that her first duty is to her client, not the public
at large., 5 4  When the attorney met with the client and her
family, she discussed both the monetary advantages of accepting
the offer and "how other people with similar heart valves could
be hurt or even die unless the truth became known," but did not
advise them what to do.55 After thinking it over, the family
decided to accept the offer. Later, the attorney regretted not
having expressed her own moral concerns more forcefully, and
wished that she had given her client "the big speech" about all
the other families who lost loved ones because of the defective
heart valve and "what they would have to go through to fight
their case from scratch., 56  Prospectively, she and her partners
decided to add a provision to the firm's retainer agreement
stating that the client will not accept any settlement with secrecy
conditions that hide safety dangers. However, the lawyers
understood that the retainer provision was unenforceable.57
The story provides a vivid illustration of the limited scope of
action that the ethics rules afford to attorneys concerned about
the dangers of secret settlements. Moral counseling is
authorized, and even encouraged, under both the Model Rules
and the Model Code. 5  Thus, it is entirely permissible to raise
54 Id. at 185.
55 Id. at 206.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 207-08. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers takes the
position that "[r]egardless of any contrary contract with a lawyer, a client may
revoke a lawyer's authority to make ... decisions" that are reserved to the client,
including "whether and on what terms to settle a claim." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 (2000). The commentary to the Model
Rules is to the same effect. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3
(2008). The lawyer's duty of candor to the client would require letting the client
know that she has the right to revoke such an agreement. See id. R. 1.2(c) (client's
"informed consent" must be obtained to any agreement limiting the scope of
representation); id. R. 2.1 (duty to give client "candid advice").
58 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008) ("In rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
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the issue with the client, whether by presenting the moral
ramifications as one relevant factor for the client to consider, as
the attorney in the heart valve case did, or-as she later wished
she had done-in the form of advice that openly expresses the
lawyer's viewpoint and is designed to persuade the client to
concur.59 Some plaintiffs' lawyers have reported great success in
getting clients to agree to and stick with a policy of no settlement
secrecy,6 but more of the practitioner literature suggests, not
surprisingly, that moral counseling will be unavailing with many
clients who have compelling needs for cash or closure. As one
plaintiffs' lawyer put it:
situation."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) ("In
assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible."); see generally Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers:
The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal
Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365 (2005) (discussing Rule 2.1 and other
provisions bearing on moral counseling, and concluding that attorneys are at times
obligated to discuss moral and other nonlegal issues with their clients).
59 See B6champs, supra note 47, at 156 (suggesting that lawyers concerned about
secret settlements engage their clients "in a dialogue regarding their joint
responsibility for certain community-shared values, such as fairness to others,
especially in cases of public interest"). How to conduct moral counseling
effectively, and in a manner that is respectful of the client's dignity and autonomy, is
a difficult issue. For a thoughtful discussion, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R.
ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL 261-99 (4th ed.
2005).
60 An article written by partners in a San Francisco plaintiffs' firm reports that, in
"seven years since our law office stopped accepting these [secrecy] agreements, not
one case has failed to settle or has settled for less as a result of this policy." Maja
Ramsey et al., Keeping Secrets with Confidentiality Agreements, TRIAL, Aug. 1998,
at 38, 40. During the first client interview, they explain the reasons for their policy
and secure the client's commitment not to accept a secret settlement. "Let clients
know that when a settlement is being presented to them, their commitment may
waver, but you will remind them of their desire to see justice done." Id. at 39.
Although "most clients with whom you have developed trust will support you....
once an acceptable settlement amount has been offered, some may just want to end
the case." Id. at 40. With these clients, the firm goes into full persuasion mode. In
one case, the firm offered to reduce its fees by $25,000 to show how important
resisting confidentiality was to them, and the client then agreed to stand firm-with
no reduction in fees-and the case still settled for the amount originally offered.
See id. at 40-41; see also TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE
152-54 (2008) (discussing noneconomic motivations that led many plaintiffs and
their attorneys in clergy sexual abuse cases to resist financial incentives to accept
secret settlements); James A. Lowe, How to Fight Protective Orders: Strategies and
Sources of Support, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 76, 77-78 (stating that most plaintiffs will
accept their lawyers' advice to refuse settlement offers conditioned on complete
confidentiality because of their desire to help others and prevent future deaths).
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A client who is desperate for funds for medical care or other
expenses . . .may have no choice but to accept what the
defendant offers. Putting the public good before the client's
interests ... would be a breach of the lawyer's ethical duty to
the client if it meant the defendant's refusal to settle.61
Similar sentiments have been expressed by numerous plaintiffs'
lawyers. Despite strong misgivings about settlement secrecy,
• 62
they feel that their hands are tied.
When the issue is framed as a conflict between the client's
right to decide and the interests of the public or third parties, the
ethics rules do in fact effectively tie the lawyer's hands. Under
the Model Rules, lawyers are required to "abide by a client's
decisions" concerning the objectives of the representation and
whether to settle a matter, and to "consult with the client" about
63the means to be employed in pursuit of these ends. Assuming
that the decision to include a secrecy clause in a settlement can
be categorized as a question of means-how to effectuate a
settlement-rather than as one of objectives or "whether to
settle," the leeway that the Model Rules provide is still
exceedingly narrow. The commentary to Rule 1.2 notes that
"lawyers usually defer to the client regarding stich questions as
... concern for third persons who might be adversely affected."
64
61 Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, TRIAL, June 1999,
at 55, 56.
62 "[T]hey offer a big settlement if you'll keep quiet.... You're representing a
client, not a public interest. I have clients with injuries who need the money. What
are we supposed to do? Our hands are tied." Siegel, supra note 18 (quoting a
Seattle plaintiff's attorney). For similar attorney statements, see Carroll et al.,
supra note 26; Davan Maharaj, Firestone Recall Puts Spotlight on Secret Liability
Settlements, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 2000, at A3; Sacha Pfeiffer, Crisis
in the Church: Critical Eye Cast on Sex Abuse Lawyers Confidentiality, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 3, 2002, at Al; Weiser, supra note 26. For practitioner articles
expressing this view, see Philip H. Corboy, Secret Settlements: The Challenges
Remain, TRIAL, June 1993, at 122, 122-24; E. Marla Felcher, Safety Secrets Keep
Consumers in the Dark, TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 40, 48-49; Martin H. Freeman &
Robert K. Jenner, Just Say No: Resisting Protective Orders, TRIAL, Mar. 1990, at 66,
70; James L. Gilbert et al., The Price of Silence, TRIAL, June 1994, at 17, 18; Eugene
I. Pavalon & Thomas G. Alvary, Protective and Secrecy Orders: Time for Change,
TRIAL, Mar. 1991, at 110, 113; Nicole Schultheis, Court Secrecy: A Continuing
National Disgrace, LITIG., Winter 2002, at 29, 29-30.
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2008).
64 Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 2. Another rule prohibits the use of means "that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person," even
if desired by a client. Id. R. 4.4(a). The "no substantial purpose" qualification
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"Usually" does not mean "always," and the rule on its face does
not require the lawyer to defer.65 If the lawyer does not accept
the client's decision, however, the only recourse available to the
lawyer is to withdraw from the representation-and even that
may be impossible if the tribunal denies permission to
withdraw. 66 In the end, the lawyer has little choice but to assist
the client in settling on any terms that the client deems
acceptable, so long as those terms are not criminal, fraudulent,
or placed off-limits by an ethics rule.
Recent changes to the confidentiality provisions of the Model
Rules may have the indirect effect of making it impermissible for
lawyers to enter into some settlement secrecy arrangements that
hide safety risks. The exceptions to the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality contained in the original version of Model Rule
1.6 had no apparent application to the issue of settlement
secrecy. Lawyers were authorized to disclose information to
prevent "imminent death or substantial bodily harm," but only
in situations where the danger stemmed from an intended
67
criminal act by the lawyer's own client. In 2002, the ABA
leaves the rule with little content. Settlement secrecy clearly serves purposes that
benefit one or both of the contracting parties.
65 See also id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (stating that a lawyer "is not bound ... to press for
every advantage that might be realized for a client" and "may have authority to
exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should
be pursued"). The Model Code is more categorical in endorsing client authority to
decide whether to use means that may harm others. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) ("[T]he decision whether to forego legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and
not for [the lawyer].").
66 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2008) (permitting a
lawyer to withdraw if "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement"); id. R.
1.16(c) (requiring the lawyer to comply with applicable law requiring a tribunal's
permission to withdraw and to continue the representation if the tribunal so
orders). Under the Model Code, a lawyer's disagreement with a client's decision
affords a permissible basis for withdrawal only "in a matter not pending before a
tribunal." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (1981);
see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 159, 393-97
(1988) (analyzing the Model Code and Model Rules and concluding that they "put
ultimate decision-making authority about whether to forgo an unjust action in the
hands of the client, [and] the lawyer's autonomy is ultimately limited to
withdrawal").
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (authorizing
disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm"). A
parallel provision in the Code permits disclosure of the client's intention to commit
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broadened this exception, which now reads as follows: "A lawyer
may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm., 68  The
danger need not come from the client, or involve an intended
crime. Thus, under the new rule, a plaintiff's lawyer may blow
the whistle on serious continuing safety risks arising from the
defendant's conduct, even if the lawyer's client agreed to keep
the information confidential. Professor Susan Koniak has
argued that in jurisdictions that adopt the new rule, it is
unethical for a lawyer to agree to a settlement that bars the
lawyer from disclosing such information, because "discretion
given ... for the purpose of protecting the courts, third parties,
or society as a whole should not be available as an asset for the
lawyer to trade away for her own pecuniary benefit or that of her
client.,
69
Nonetheless, for several reasons the ABA's broadening of the
confidentiality exception is unlikely to have much of an impact
on settlement secrecy. Nearly half of the states have not
adopted the ABA's new bodily harm exception and continue to
a crime and any information necessary to prevent it. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981).
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008). In 2003, in response
to the Enron and corporate fraud scandals, the ABA House of Delegates added
further exceptions to the confidentiality rule that permit disclosures to prevent a
client crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial financial
injury to others, or to prevent, rectify, or mitigate the financial harm caused by such
conduct. These exceptions apply only in situations where the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services in furtherance of the crime or fraud. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2)
& (3).
69 Koniak, supra note 13, at 808; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 284-85 (2006);
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 51-57 (2005) (arguing that discretionary rules such as the one
permitting disclosures to protect third parties from harm require that lawyers
exercise conscientious discretion, and it is an abuse of discretion to enter into an
agreement never to disclose). Several states, in adopting the ABA's revised bodily
harm rule, have made the disclosure duty mandatory rather than discretionary. See,
e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (2006); TENN. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2008); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1) (2006). In those jurisdictions, it is clearly unethical for an attorney to
agree not to make disclosures that are mandatory under the rules. Cf ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994) (concluding that in
circumstances where Model Rule 8.3 requires a lawyer to report misconduct by
another lawyer, a settlement agreement barring such disclosure would violate the
Rules).
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restrict such disclosures to situations related to preventing the
lawyer's own client from committing a crime. Where the rule
has been adopted, it kicks in only when death or serious injury is
"reasonably certain., 71 A lawyer faced with a settlement offer
that is financially advantageous to the client, and to the lawyer
herself, will have strong incentive to conclude that any danger
posed by the conduct covered by a confidentiality agreement
falls short of this threshold.72 The bodily harm exception has no
application to nonphysical injuries, such as those caused by
employment discrimination.73  In addition, the rule only
authorizes disclosures necessary to prevent future death or
injury from occurring, not disclosures aimed at helping other
70 As of the end of December 2008, the ABA's new version of Model Rule
1.6(b)(1) had been substantially adopted in twenty-nine states.
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008). The official
comment says that the "reasonably certain" requirement is satisfied when there is
"a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date."
Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 6. However, the language of the rule itself suggests a more stringent
standard. A few states adopting the rule have eliminated the "reasonably certain"
requirement or replaced it with a "reasonably likely" standard. See, e.g., FLA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (2006); GA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)(ii) (2008); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 20:1.6(c)(1)
(2008).
72 See David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICS 125, 128-29 (1999) (arguing that a proposed rule prohibiting
lawyers from negotiating settlement agreements that suppress information about
substantial dangers to public health or safety would be ineffective because lawyers
will resolve doubts in favor of concluding that the danger is insufficient to trigger
the rule). There is reason to believe that lawyers tend to resolve all doubts against
making disclosures harmful to their clients' interests. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing
the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to
Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 128-30 (1994) (finding, based on a survey of
New Jersey attorneys, that in situations where a state ethics rule required them to
report information to prevent bodily harm, a majority failed to do so, and less than
nine percent of attorneys who faced situations where the rule required disclosure to
prevent financial injuries to others complied).
73 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008). The provisions
of the ABA's new confidentiality rule that allow disclosures to prevent injuries of a
nonphysical nature apply only where the harm arises from a client's crime or fraud
in which the lawyer's services have been used. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3). Many states
have rules authorizing disclosures aimed at preventing financial injury to others, but
nearly all such rules are limited to situations where such disclosure is necessary to
prevent client crime or fraud. See Disclosure: Crimes and Frauds, Lawyers' Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 55:901 (2008) (describing state rules). New Jersey
appears to be the only state that has enacted a confidentiality exception broad
enough to allow disclosures aimed at preventing financial injuries caused by
"illegal" (not just criminal or fraudulent) conduct by a client or nonclient. N.J.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)-(c) (2006).
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victims recover compensation for their past injuries.4  Finally,
the rule's effect on secrecy agreements is, at most, to prohibit a
lawyer from promising not to disclose certain information.
Noncooperation agreements that bar the lawyer's client from
submitting to voluntary witness interviews, and thereby increase
the cost to other parties of gathering evidence, are unaffected.
Arguments against settlement secrecy that are premised on
the public interest in disclosure and the need to protect others
from harm are morally powerful, but the framework of the
existing ethics rules does very little to accommodate them. The
dominant paradigm reflected in the ethics codes posits that in
the long run, society is best served if lawyers keep their clients'
confidences and pursue their clients' interests, and that lawyers
have "no responsibilities to third parties or the public different
from that of the minimal compliance with law that is required of
everyone.,75 Lawyers who would like to "just say no" to secret
settlements because of their public harms, without violating the
rules themselves, are largely stuck. To break out of the bind
would require either a change in the law or a radical rethinking
of lawyers' ethics. As for the first, little headway has been made
76in enacting legislation to outlaw secrecy agreements. With
respect to the latter, legal scholars have sought to redefine the
lawyer's role to place greater weight on "ordinary morality" or
achieving justice than on client interests,77 but ABA rule drafters
and the state courts responsible for adopting disciplinary codes
have shown little interest in departing from the traditional
paradigm. The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission rejected a
74 Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. i.6(b)(1) (2008). Disclosures for
the purpose of rectifying financial injuries are allowed under the new ABA
confidentiality rule and the rules of some states, but only in situations where the
harm resulted from a client crime or fraud in furtherance of which the lawyer's
services were used. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3); Disclosure: Crimes and Frauds, Laws. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 55:901 (2008) (describing state rules).
75 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 8 (1998) (characterizing the
"Dominant View" of legal ethics); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbl. para. 8 (2008) (positing that zealous advocacy and preserving client
confidences ordinarily serve the public interest).
76 See Koniak, supra note 13, at 809 (arguing that, in order to prevent lawyers
from negotiating secrecy agreements that hide information about wrongful conduct,
"other law needs to outlaw these agreements"); supra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative efforts to regulate settlement secrecy).
77 See LUBAN, supra note 66; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE 49-80 (2000); SIMON, supra note 75.
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proposal to amend the Model Rules to prohibit lawyer
involvement in settlements that hide information about health or
safety risks from the public, unanimously agreeing "that the
ethics rules were not the vehicle for solving this problem.
78
In recent years, several commentators have argued that
noncooperation agreements and some other types of settlement
secrecy are, in fact, already illegal. Stephen Gillers has attacked
attorney involvement in noncooperation settlements on the
ground that such agreements violate federal obstruction of
justice laws.79 Susan Koniak and John Freeman have argued
that settlements suppressing information about unlawful conduct
amount to the crime of compounding.g These are arguments
that operate within the premises of the standard view; they
assume that a lawyer may ethically negotiate any lawful
settlement terms but rely on the outer limitation the rules set on
zealous advocacy: a lawyer must not counsel or assist in conduct
the lawyer knows to be criminal.8 ' The flip side of this ethical
analysis is that if the criminality of such settlements is unclear, it
does not violate the rules for an attorney to negotiate settlement
terms that will serve the client's interests. There have been no
court decisions finding criminal liability based on settlement
secrecy, or even any known prosecutions. While acknowledging
uncertainty in the law,"2 Gillers takes the view that, at a
minimum, lawyers have a professional obligation to advise their
clients that noncooperation agreements expose them to a
significant risk of criminal liability,83 advice that probably would
78 Comm'n on the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, ABA Ctr. for Prof'l
Responsibility, Minutes, pt. V (Feb. 16-17, 2001), available at http://www.abanet
.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-02-16mtg.html. The proposed rule would have barred lawyers
from participating in settlements that "restrict the availability to the public of
information that the lawyer reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial
danger to .. . health or safety." Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret
Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICS 115, 116 (1999).
79 See Gillers, supra note 10, at 5, 12-13.
80 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 835-37; Koniak, supra note 13, at 793-95, 802.
81 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1981); Freeman, supra note 13, at 845;
Gillers, supra note 10, at 13; Koniak, supra note 13, at 806-07.
82 See Gillers, supra note 10, at 3, 16; see also Koniak, supra note 13, at 794-95,
806.
83 Gillers, supra note 10, at 3, 12, 16.
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be sufficient to dissuade most clients from pursuing such
agreements.
The absence of prosecutions, however, is not simply a matter
of prosecutorial forbearance. It is very unlikely that a settlement
that prohibits voluntary disclosures to private litigants would be
found to be criminal. (The reasons, which are complex and may
not be of interest to all readers, are addressed in the Appendix
to this Article.) Certain types of noncooperation provisions do
run a high risk of violating criminal statutes-those that make no
exception for disclosures in response to a subpoena or court
order, forbid voluntary disclosures to a court or government
agency when an official proceeding is known to be pending or
imminent, or prohibit informing law enforcement authorities
about criminal conduct (under certain circumstances). As a
general matter, however, the risk of criminal liability for a
carefully drafted noncooperation agreement is minimal."4
Therefore, attorneys have no obligation to refrain from
noncooperation settlements because they "know" them to be
criminal, or to warn their clients that they face significant risk by
entering into such settlements.
III
THE RULES AGAINST REQUESTING WITNESS
NONCOOPERATION
The standard view of the ethics of settlement secrecy, with its
focus on the client's autonomy to pursue any lawful objective
and the lawyer's duty to abide by client decisions, leaves lawyers
with little choice but to participate in settlements that hide
relevant facts from other litigants. The standard view, however,
overlooks a crucial dimension of lawyers' ethical obligations. It
conceptualizes the problem as a conflict between client interests
and the potential for harm to third parties or society. Under the
ethics rules, the lawyer's fundamental duties to clients-zealous
advocacy, respect for client autonomy and confidentiality-
nearly always trump concerns for the welfare of outsiders.
However, another strand in the ethics codes imposes significant
84 See infra Appendix, text accompanying notes 353-55, 360-61, 363, 369-70
(discussing circumstances under which noncooperation provisions may violate
criminal statutes and drafting approaches that avoid any significant risk of criminal
liability).
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limitations on lawyer conduct that are designed to protect the
integrity of adjudication and the proper functioning of an
adversary system of justice. These duties do not depend on what
clients want or what "other law" allows. They are obligations
that derive from the lawyer's role as an "officer of the legal
system" with "special responsibility for the quality of justice., 85
Two such duties have direct bearing on the propriety of lawyers
offering or accepting settlements conditioned on
noncooperation: the requirement that lawyers not ask potential
witnesses to withhold voluntary cooperation from other parties,
and the prohibition of attorney conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Model Rule 3.4(f) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not .. .
request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily
giving relevant information to another party., 86 An exception
allows such requests to be made to a relative, employee, or other
agent of the client, provided that "the lawyer reasonably believes
that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by
refraining from giving such information., 87 The rule has its roots
in an influential and widely accepted formal ethics opinion
88issued by the American Bar Association in 1935. It rests on the
idea that the fair and efficient functioning of the adversary
system requires that litigants and their lawyers have an
unfettered opportunity to seek information relevant to their
claims, and that the decision whether to cooperate should be a
voluntary one made by the witness. When lawyers try to
obstruct voluntary cooperation, they are interfering with the
proper functioning of the adversary system by making informal
witness interviews, an essential tool of case preparation,
unavailable to their adversaries, and requiring them to resort to
more costly, and often less effective, means of gathering
evidence.
How significant a barrier Rule 3.4(f) poses to noncooperation
settlements depends on questions of interpretation. The rule
generally prohibits a lawyer from requesting a nonclient to
85 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2008).
86 Id. R. 3.4(f). The Restatement recognizes this duty as well. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116(4) (2000).
87 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1)-(2) (2008).
88 See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 105-11.
2008]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
"refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another
party." 89 The rule's language contains no exception for requests
made as part of a settlement offer, but can an implicit settlement
exception be read into the rule? Does the phrase "another
party" apply only to a person who is formally a party in a
pending case, or does it also extend to individuals or entities with
potential claims against the lawyer's client? Under the narrower
reading, most noncooperation agreements, which are aimed at
potential future claims, would lie outside the rule's scope. A
great deal also depends on how broadly or narrowly one reads
the exception allowing such requests to be made to an employee
or agent of the client. Does the exception allow noncooperation
agreements in settlements with former employees, or in
severance agreements made prior to an employee's termination?
Model Rule 8.4(d), which carries forward an identical
provision from the Model Code, declares that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice. '" It may be invoked in
situations not covered by Rule 3.4(f)'s express terms but
implicating its core purposes, such as when a plaintiff's lawyer
accepts a noncooperation clause offered by opposing counsel, or
a defense lawyer demands that a plaintiff not testify voluntarily
at a trial or hearing. 91
A closer look at the origins and development of the principle
that requests for witness noncooperation are improper will help
to shed light on the prohibition's purpose and how the applicable
ethics rules should be interpreted. The idea that obstructing
access to informal witness interviews interferes with the proper
functioning of the adversary system, and is therefore
impermissible conduct for attorneys, was well-established by the
1930s and familiar to the drafters of modern ethics codes. An
extensive body of judicial precedent, developed in several
different contexts, disapproves of efforts to obstruct litigants'
92
access to informal witness interviews for the same reasons.
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008).
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981).
91 See infra notes 246-63, 279-81 and accompanying text.
92 See infra Parts III.A-D.
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The general question of what interpretive approach to follow
in construing ambiguous or vaguely framed professional conduct
rules also requires attention. Ethics rules should not be read like
penal statutes; they should be construed in a way that is not
unmoored from the rules' language but strives to give full effect
to the underlying principles implicit in the codes' structure and
purposes. Approached in this way, the rules can and should be
construed to forbid attorneys, with few exceptions, from
negotiating settlements conditioned on noncooperation.94
A. Origins of the Principle
The ABA's first ethics code, the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics, contained a provision suggesting that a public prosecutor
should not request a witness to refrain from disclosing
exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, 95 but otherwise offered
scant guidance on how far a lawyer may go in influencing a
96
nonclient's cooperation with an adversary. Case law and
treatises on legal ethics through the early twentieth century also
97had little to say on the subject. The first ethical standard on
93 See infra Part IV.A.
94 See infra Part IV.B.
95 ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908) ("The suppression of facts
or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is
highly reprehensible.").
96 Canon 9 made it clear that the lawyer's own client could be advised not to
speak with an opposing attorney. See id. Canon 9 (prohibiting lawyer
communications with a party represented by counsel about the matter in
controversy). Other canons admonished all lawyers to "treat adverse witnesses.. .
with fairness and due consideration" and to "deal ... candidly with the facts in
taking the statements of witnesses." Id. Canons 18, 22.
97 Some early ethics treatises, in general terms, condemned interference with a
witness's availability or testimony. See 2 EDWARD M. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON
ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 818 (1914) ("[A] lawyer who in any manner attempts to
suppress truth, or to prevent a witness from appearing in court . . . is guilty of
misconduct ...."); GEORGE WILLIAM WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS §
191a (2d ed. 1920) (stating that it is unethical for an attorney to tamper with an
adverse witness so that he cannot testify, or offer direct or indirect inducements to
influence the witness's testimony). In an 1888 federal disciplinary decision, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller declared that a lawyer would deserve
disbarment had he done what he was accused of: arranging to get a witness drunk,
hiding him to prevent him from being deposed, and seeking to induce the witness to
change the content of his testimony. See In re Thomas, 36 F. 242, 242-44 (C.C.D.
Colo. 1888). However, Justice Miller determined that the lawyer's actual intent was
merely to interview the witness before his deposition to find out what he had to say.
See id. at 245. He expressed distaste for the lawyer's conduct, and lauded the
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access to witnesses came in 1928, when the ABA adopted Canon
39, providing that a lawyer "is not .. .to be deterred from
seeking to ascertain the truth from [a witness] in the interest of
his client," even if the witness is "connected with or reputed to
be biased in favor of an adverse party., 98 This was amended in
1937 to read, "A lawyer may properly interview any witness or
prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal
action without the consent of opposing counsel or party." 99
A corollary principle, making it unethical for a lawyer to
interfere with the right and duty recognized in Canon 39 by
requesting witnesses not to speak with opposing counsel,
evolved in a series of ABA formal ethics opinions in the 1920s
and 1930s.' ° In 1928, the ABA's ethics committee determined
that a criminal defense lawyer acted ethically when, without the
prosecutor's knowledge or consent, he met with a prosecution
witness to request an affidavit retracting trial testimony that the
lawyer had reason to believe was false. The committee found
the lawyer's actions proper because "in no sense is [the witness]
the prosecutor's client, and in no aspect has the United States
Government, or its prosecuting attorney, a vested interest in or
ownership of the witness. ' '
English practice of barring barristers from speaking with witnesses outside of court,
but concluded that under the American system interviewing an opponent's
witnesses cannot be considered misconduct. See id. at 244-46. The decision did not
address whether urging a witness not to voluntary cooperate with an opponent
would be unethical.
98 ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 39 (1928).
99 ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 39 (1937). The Canon added that in
interviewing such a witness the lawyer should "avoid any suggestion calculated to
induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth" or "affect his free and
untrammeled conduct when appearing at the trial." Id.
100 The ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances began issuing
advisory opinions in 1924, and its interpretations of the vaguely worded Canons
were widely accepted as authoritative by bench and bar. See Ted Finman &
Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 70-71, 80 (1981); see also John F.
Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 264 (1970) (noting that the Model Code's
drafting committee relied heavily on opinions of the ABA ethics committee when it
codified existing ethical standards that had developed under the Canons).
101 ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 12 (1928). Canon
39 had not yet been adopted when this opinion was issued, and the committee
rested its conclusion on the duty of zealous representation contained in Canon 15.
See id. In 1933, the committee rendered a similar opinion on the propriety of
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The committee further developed the idea that no lawyer can
claim "ownership" over a nonparty witness in 1934, when it held
that the plaintiff's attorney in a slip-and-fall case could interview
store clerks who had witnessed the accident.'0 2 The committee
found the Canon prohibiting communication with a represented
party inapplicable because the opposing lawyer represented the
store owner, not the owner's employees; Canon 39's duty to seek
out the truth was controlling. 10 3  The opinion invoked the
interests of the adjudicatory system as well as the lawyer's duty
of zeal: "The ascertainment of the truth is always essential to the
attainment of justice and it is the duty of the attorney to learn
the facts by every fair means within his reach."' 4
Formal Opinion 131, issued in 1935, crystallized the rule
against requests for witness noncooperation, and gave the fullest
expression to the reasons behind it.' 05 The opinion began in
rule-like fashion:
It is improper for an attorney, by virtue of his personal or
professional relations, to influence persons, other than his
clients or their employees, to refuse to give information to
opposing counsel which may be useful or essential to opposing
counsel in establishing the true facts and circumstances
affecting the dispute.106
While acknowledging "the duty Of lawyers charged with the
responsibility of representing clients against whom claims are
presented to do every just and proper thing to defend them," the
committee found that a more fundamental commitment was at
stake: "However, when controversies arise, and claims are
asserted, the interests of justice ... require that the truth in the
field of fact as well as of law be ascertained so far as is humanly
possible.' 1 7 Based on Canon 39 and other provisions,108 the
committee reasoned that noncooperation requests are improper,
defense counsel interviewing prosecution witnesses, this time relying on Canon 39.
See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 101 (1933).
102 See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 117 (1934).
103 See id.
104 Id.
105 See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 In addition to quoting from Canon 39, the committee recited broad statements
from other canons concerning the lawyer's duties of candor, fairness, and fidelity to
the law. See id. (quoting Canons 22, 15, 32, and 39).
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because "[n]o lawyer should endeavor in any way, directly or
indirectly, to prevent the truth from being presented to the court
in the event litigation arises. ''l)n It cited its earlier opinions as
standing for the proposition that witnesses cannot be viewed as
belonging to one side or the other"0 and concluded, "All persons
who know anything about the facts in controversy are, in simple
truth, the law's witnesses. They are the human instrumentalities
through which the law, and its ministers, the judges and the
lawyers, endeavor to ascertain truth, and to award justice to the
contending parties."'I
Three years after Formal Opinion 131 was issued, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. The Supreme Court's
famous decision in Hickman v. Taylor' 12 made it clear that the
liberal discovery regime ushered in by the rules did not render
the ex parte witness interview any less important for the
ascertainment of truth and the presentation of relevant facts to
the tribunal. In holding that witness statements obtained by a
lawyer are generally shielded from discovery, ' 3 the Court
stressed that in an adversary system ex parte witness interviews
are essential to each side's ability to sift through the facts and
present them effectively at trial:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [the lawyer]
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within
the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promotejustice and to protect their clients' interests.
If witness statements were discoverable, Hickman reasoned, the
impairment of counsel's ability to gather facts in private would
109 Id.
110 "We have held that it is proper for a lawyer to interview persons even though
they be persons who might, as is frequently inaccurately said, be the 'other side's
witnesses."' Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Ops.
12 (1928) and 117 (1934)).
'"1 Id.
112 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
113 See id. at 508-14. The statements at issue in Hickman included both signed
written statements that the defendants' lawyer obtained from witnesses after
interviewing them and memoranda prepared by the lawyer recounting what other
witnesses told him during interviews. See id. at 498.
114 Id. at 511.
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undermine the quality of information presented to the court and
the end result in terms of justice.
Logically, the same would hold true if counsel were prevented
at the outset from speaking with witnesses outside the
adversary's presence. A line of judicial precedent that emerged
in the 1960s and 1970s built upon both Hickman's reasoning and
the ABA Canons to prohibit interference with informal witness
interviews. In Gregory v. United States,115 an influential 1966
opinion by J. Skelly Wright, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed a murder and robbery conviction because
the prosecutor advised witnesses not to speak to defense counsel
unless he was present. 116 The court held that the prosecutor's
actions violated the defendant's due process rights and was
inconsistent with Canon 39's recognition of the propriety of
conducting witness interviews without opposing counsel's
consent." 7 The opinion's rhetoric was redolent of both the ABA
ethics committee decisions and Hickman:
Witnesses ... are the property of neither the prosecution nor
the defense. Both sides have an equal right, and should have
an equal opportunity, to interview them.
• . . Presumably the prosecutor, in interviewing the
witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence of defense
counsel, and there seems to be no reason why defense counsel
should not have an equal opportunity to determine, through
interviews with the witnesses, what they know about the case
and what they will testify to ....
A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for
truth. That quest will more often be successful if both sides
have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have
the information from which the truth may be determined.
11
'
115 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
116 See id. at 187-89, 192. There were also other grounds for reversal.
117 See id. at 188-89. The court also found that the prosecutor's actions
undermined the purposes of a federal statute requiring disclosure of witness
identities. See id. at 187-89.
118 Id. at 188.
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Gregory has been widely followed,11 9 and its reasoning has not
been limited to criminal cases, where a prosecutor's special
obligations to serve justice and the general unavailability of
depositions lend extra support to its rule. In IBM Corp. v.
120Edelstein, the Second Circuit overturned a trial judge's order
that prohibited witness interviews unless opposing counsel was
present or a transcript was prepared, deeming it "contrary to
time-honored and decision-honored principles ... that counsel
for all parties have a right to interview an adverse party's
witnesses (the witness willing) in private., 121 From Hickman and
Gregory, the court drew the lesson that the truth-finding
function of adversary litigation is undermined if counsel cannot
conduct confidential witness interviews, which help to "insur[e]
the presentation of the best possible case at trial.'
122
Depositions, the court found, are no substitute because the
presence of opposing counsel and a court reporter hinders the
lawyer's ability to freely
explore the witness' knowledge, memory and opinion-
frequently in light of information counsel may have developed
from other sources .... It is the common experience of counsel
at the trial bar that a potential witness, upon reflection, will
often change, modify or expand upon his original statement
and that a second or third interview will be productive of
greater accuracy.123
119 See David S. Caudill, Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense
Contact with Victims, Survivors, and Witnesses in the Era of Victims' Rights, 17 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 105-06, 113 (2003). The decisions frequently invoke the
themes that a witness is neither side's property and must be allowed to exercise his
or her own free will in deciding whether to be interviewed, and that attempts to
influence the witness's decision undermine the truth-seeking function of an
adversary trial. See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 601, 603-04 (10th
Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 408 F. Supp. 476, 481 (D.N.J.
1976), affd, 563 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1977); Johnston v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 356 F. Supp.
904, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Coppolino v. Helpern, 266 F. Supp. 930, 935-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mota v. Buchanan, 547 P.2d 517, 520, 522 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976);
State v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263-65 (Or. 1981); Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas,
260 A.2d 184, 188-89 (Pa. 1969); State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 478-82 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1994).
120 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
121 Id. at 42.
122 Id.; see also id. at 42-44.
123 Id. at 41. The court went on,
In contrast to the pre-trial interview with prospective witnesses, a
deposition serves an entirely different purpose, which is to perpetuate
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The two leading legal ethics treatises in use when the Model
Code and Model Rules were drafted, Henry Drinker's 1953
Legal Ethics124 and Raymond Wise's late 1960s treatise of the125
same name, both cited Formal Opinion 131 and endorsed its
principle that requests for witness noncooperation are
unethical. 126 An extensive discussion of the issue could also be
found in Harvard law professor Robert Keeton's trial practice
127text. Keeton noted the potential tactical advantages of
advising witnesses not to discuss the case with the opposing party
or counsel; such advice, if followed, will "increase your
adversary's difficulties of preparation and your own chances of
superior preparation., 128  It forces your adversary to take
depositions, allowing you to keep tabs on what your adversary
has learned and gain insight into your opponent's theory of the129
case. "The nature of these tactical advantages," Keeton
continued, "demonstrates that the practice of encouraging
witnesses not to talk to the opposing party or his representatives
is opposed to the interests of full and fair development of facts.
testimony, to have it available for use or confrontation at the trial, or to
have the witness committed to a specific representation of such facts as he
might present. A desire to depose formally would arise normally after
preliminary interviews might have caused counsel to decide to take a
deposition.
Id. at 41 n.4.
124 HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953). The Model Code's preface
states that the drafting committee that developed the Code "relied heavily upon"
Drinker's work. Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., Preface to the 1977 Version of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, in AM. BAR FOUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY xix, xx (1979) [hereinafter ANNOTATED CODE].
As recently as 1981, Drinker was viewed as "the best known treatise in the field."
Finman & Schneyer, supra note 100, at 80 n.52,
125 RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS (1st ed. 1966).. Wise published a second
edition in 1970 and supplements through 1979. Until the early 1980s, Wise served
as "the only comprehensive and up-to-date treatise on attorneys' professional
responsibilities." Finman & Schneyer, supra note 100, at 80 n.51.
126 See DRINKER, supra note 124, at 86; RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 294
(2d ed. 1970).
127 ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS (1st ed. 1954).
128 Id. at 328.
129 Id. Keeton pointed out that the adversary who is deprived of a witness's
voluntary cooperation will be at a disadvantage in gathering information even if he
conducts a deposition because "it is practically impossible to anticipate all the
matters on which the witness might be able to testify; the help of the witness in
volunteering additional information which he thinks might be material is
important." Id.
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Primarily for this reason, the practice has been held to be
ethically improper., 130 He cited to ABA Formal Opinion 131.131
B. Noncooperation Requests Under the Code
The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the
"Code"), promulgated in 1969 and quickly adopted in nearly all
132the states, was intended to systematize and update the ethical
principles that had developed under the canons, and to provide
clear rules that could serve as a basis for discipline. 133 The Code
did not explicitly address the issue of witness noncooperation
requests, and its provision relating to contacts with witnesses was
far from a model of clarity. Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-109(B)
makes it unethical for a lawyer to "advise or cause a person to
secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the
purpose of making himself unavailable as a witness therein. ' 4
The related Ethical Consideration (EC 7-27) explains that such
advice is prohibited because it "interferes with the proper
administration of justice. 1 35 A footnote to EC 7-27 references
ABA Formal Opinion 131, although the use of a "cf."
designation leaves it unclear whether the opinion was cited as an
example of what the rule prohibits or merely to note a general
similarity of purpose. 136  Narrowly construed, the disciplinary
rule's language can be read as covering only efforts to induce a
130 Id. at 328-29.
131 Id. at 329 n.3. Keeton added, however, that "it is at least doubtful that this
view prevails in all jurisdictions." Id. at 329.
132 See ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 124, at ix; Sutton, supra note 100, at 255-
56.
133 See Sutton, supra note 100, at 257-58, 264. The drafting committee made a
deliberate decision to maintain no records of its proceedings. Some legislative
history and indications of the drafters' intent can be discerned from changes made
over the course of three published drafts, footnotes included in the Model Code to
indicate sources that the committee drew upon, and later interviews with the
committee's Reporter. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl n.1
(1981); ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 124, at xi, xiii.
134 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(B) (1981). The
infelicitous phrase "secrete himself" was taken from a 1962 California bar rule that
prohibited attorneys from advising a witness "to avoid service of process, or secrete
himself, or otherwise to make his testimony unavailable," and 1908 ABA Canon 5,
which discouraged the "secreting of witnesses" by a prosecutor. Id. DR 7-109(B)
n.90.
135 Id. EC 7-27.
136 Id. EC 7-27 n.45.
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witness to duck a subpoena or not show up in court. 137 On the
other hand, requesting a witness to withhold voluntary
cooperation has the purpose and possible effect of hiding
potential testimony from adverse parties, thereby rendering it
unavailable to the tribunal, and thus plausibly could be viewed
as violating DR 7-109(B). One state supreme court and another
state's ethics committee have read the rule this way. 138  The
reach of the witness secretion rule remains of practical
importance in California, which has an ethics rule nearly
identical to DR 7-109(B) but no other rule that could be
construed to cover witness noncooperation requests.
139
137 SeeState v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263-64 (Or. 1981) (stating that the express
terms of DR 7-109 were not violated when a prosecutor advised prospective
witnesses not to speak to the defense; the court nonetheless found the conduct
improper based on policies implicit in the ethics rules and procedural statutes);
Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 84-3 (1984) (concluding that a
prosecutor's policy of advising witnesses not to talk to defense counsel unless a
prosecutor is present does not directly violate DR 7-109, but is nonetheless
improper because it runs counter to the policies reflected in the rule and the
Gregory line of cases); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 30.12, illus. 30-8, at 30-
25 (interpreting DR 7-109(B) as not prohibiting advising witnesses not to submit to
informal interviews with opposing counsel, because this does not render them
"unavailable" as witnesses, since they can still be subpoenaed).
138 See Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas, 260 A.2d 184, 188 & n.3 (Pa. 1969)
(citing DR 7-109(B), inter alia, as-basis for concluding that it was impermissible for
a district attorney to request a witness not to talk to defense counsel); Or. State Bar
Ass'n, Formal Op. 2005-132 (2005) (attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying
for an adversary, if successful, has practical effect of "causing a witness to secrete
himself" and therefore violates an Oregon ethics rule derived from DR 7-109(B)).
139 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-310(A) (2008) ("A member shall not
... [a]dvise or directly or indirectly cause a person to secrete himself or herself or to
leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making that person
unavailable as a witness therein."); see also infra note 247 (discussing Oregon rule
based on the Code's witness secretion provision). The California rules do not
include Model Rule 3.4(f) or the ABA's "conduct prejudicial" rule. An argument
for reading California's witness secretion rule broadly finds support in its wording
(which adds the phrase "directly or indirectly" to the Code prohibition) and in the
public policy expressed in the California Evidence Code, which states that, except
as authorized by statute, "[n]o person has a privilege that another shall not be a
witness or shall not disclose any matter." CAL. EVID. CODE § 911(c) (West 1995);
cf. McPhearson v. Michaels Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2002)
(concluding; based on section 911, that "it would be contrary to public policy to
permit a party to litigation to dissuade or otherwise influence the testimony of a
percipient witness through a private [settlement] agreement"). The State Bar of
California recently proposed adding a rule substantially identical to Model Rule
3.4(f) as part of a package of ethics rules revisions. COMM'N FOR THE REVISION OF
THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, STATE BAR OF CAL., DISCUSSION DRAFT,
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The Code's "catch-all" disciplinary rule forbidding "conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice , 141 can also be
read to carry forward the principle of Formal Opinion 131. This
rule replaced language in earlier drafts that would have
prohibited all conduct "degrading to the legal profession."'
41
The change was made in response to criticism from many
members of the bar that the original language was "too vague to
constitute 'fair notice' of what was prohibited.142 Given that
Formal Opinion 131 and the Gregory line of cases were well
established at the time of the Code's adoption, treating witness
noncooperation requests as "conduct prejudicial" would not
offend notions of due process. In 1974, the New Jersey Supreme
Court showed no hesitation in disciplining a criminal defense
lawyer who urged two witnesses, who were not his clients, to
cooperate as little as possible if questioned by law enforcement
officials, on the basis of the Code's "conduct prejudicial" rule. 143
Despite the absence of explicit language in the Code
addressing the issue, commentators at the time believed that
Formal Opinion 131's rule against requesting witness
noncooperation remained intact. In the 1970s editions of his
legal ethics treatise, Raymond Wise took the view that the
Code's rule against secreting witnesses and suppressing evidence
carried forward the principle of Opinion 131.'44 Robert Keeton
made no change in his analysis of why noncooperation requests
are unethical in the second edition of his trial practice book in
1973,145 and other Code-era treatises expressed similar views.
146
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 20 (March 2008), R. 3.4(h).
140 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981).
141 ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 124, at 12.
142 Id. (citing interview with John Sutton, the Code's reporter). The concern for
"fair notice" apparently did not extend to an equally broad and vague provision
that did make it into the Code, prohibiting "any other conduct that adversely
reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1981). This provision was dropped in the Model
Rules, while the provision on "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice"
was retained. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983); see infra note 169
and accompanying text.
143 In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15, 17-18 (N.J. 1974).
144 See WISE, supra note 126, at 109 & n.32; RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS
97 & n.15, 459 (question 109), 494 (answer to question 109) (2d ed. Supp. 1979).
145 ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 339-40 (2d ed. 1973);
see also supra text accompanying notes 127-31 (discussing Keeton's analysis).
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C. Noncooperation Requests Under the Model Rules
Dissatisfaction with the Code and a desire to repair the legal
profession's image after Watergate led the ABA in 1977 to
appoint a commission, chaired by Omaha attorney Robert
Kutak, to review professional conduct standards.1 47 The Kutak
Commission released a discussion draft of new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in January 1980,148 and, after holding
public hearings and reviewing extensive comments, issued its
proposed final draft in May 1981.149 The ABA House of
Delegates debated the proposal over the next two years, made
some amendments, and adopted the Model Rules in August
1983.150
The Kutak Commission's discussion draft expressly provided
that a prosecutor shall not "discourage a person from giving
relevant information to the defense,"' 51 but otherwise dealt with
the issue of witness noncooperation obliquely, in rules that
barred "improperly obstruct[ing] another party's access to
evidence" or "seek[ing] improperly to influence a witness. 1 52
146 The ABA approved the Model Rules in August 1983, but it was not adopted
by a majority of the states until 1988. See ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/chronstates.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). Charles Wolfram, in his
1986 legal ethics treatise, stated that "[w]itnesses do not 'belong' to either party and
generally should be as available for interviews to one side as to the other." He
relied on the Gregory and Edelstein line of decisions, and did not mention the new
Model Rule 3.4(f). CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.2
(1986). Another mid-1980s treatise, citing Formal Opinion 131 and Keeton's
discussion, concluded that it is "almost certainly ethically improper" to attempt to
dissuade a nonparty witness from cooperating with an adversary. DAVID A.
BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 245 n.2 (1984).
147 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 REC.
OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 77, 82-93 (1981); Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677,688-93 (1989).
148 COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
DISCUSSION DRAFT, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1980)
[hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT].
149 COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1981)
[hereinafter PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT].
150 See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 1982-2005, at viii-ix (2006) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
151 DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 148, R. 3.10(e).
152 Id. R. 3.2(b)(1), 3.7(b)(2).
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Commentary to the obstruction rule stated that "a lawyer may
properly advise a client against giving a statement or other
evidence except under the lawyer's supervision," implying that a
nonclient may not be given such advice.153 Although the drafters
probably meant to carry forward the principle of Formal
Opinion 131, the absence of an express prohibition for anyone
but prosecutors could have been read to mean that requests for
witness noncooperation were not generally barred.
In response to bar criticism of the vagueness and potentially
broad scope of the duties expressed in the discussion draft, the
Kutak Commission, in its proposed final draft, replaced the
prohibitions of "improper" conduct relating to evidence and
witnesses with provisions making it impermissible for a lawyer to
"unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence" or
"offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.'' 154
At the same time, the commission added a new subsection (f) to
define a duty that went beyond what other law required.
Rule 3.4(f) closely tracked the approach of Formal Opinion
131 by making it impermissible for a lawyer to "request a person
other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party., 155  Like the earlier ABA
pronouncement, it recognized an exception allowing such
requests to be made to the client's employees.156 The exception
was extended to cover nonemployee agents and relatives of the
client as well, while adding the proviso that the lawyer must
"reasonabl[y] .. .believe that the person's interests will not be
adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.'
157
153 Id. R. 3.2 cmt.
154 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4(a) & (b) (emphasis added);
see Schneyer, supra note 147, at 707-08.
155 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFt, supra note 149, R. 3.4(f). The Proposed Final
Draft also dropped the Discussion Draft's prohibition of prosecution requests that a
witness not cooperate with the defense. See id. R. 3.8. The commission presumably
viewed it as no longer necessary in light of the addition of a rule spelling out a
similar obligation for all attorneys.
156 Id. R. 3.4(f)(1); cf. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
131 (1935) (stating that "[i]t is improper for an attorney ... to influence persons,
other than his clients or their employees, to refuse to give relevant information to
opposing counsel").
157 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4(f)(1) & (2). In the ethics
treatise that he later cowrote, Geoffrey Hazard, who served as Reporter to the
Kutak Commission, explained that this caveat is designed to protect the client's
relatives or employees from receiving advice that might cause them harm from a
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The official comment that appeared in the Proposed Final
Draft (and was ultimately adopted by the ABA) offered little
explanation for subsection (f). The comment noted generally
that "[t]he procedure of the adversary system contemplates that
the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the
contending parties," and that all of Rule 3.4's restrictions are
designed to secure "[f]air competition in the adversary
system. ,
,1 58
When Rule 3.4 was taken up by the ABA House of Delegates,
Geoffrey Hazard, the Kutak Commission's Reporter, opened
the discussion of subsection (f) by noting that no direct
counterpart appeared in the Code. 159 He described it as an effort
"to deal more precisely than present law" with a problematic
issue. 16°  Four state and local bar associations had filed
amendments seeking to strike the provision.16 ' A representative
of the Philadelphia Bar Association presented the case for
eliminating subsection (f). He argued that it was unnecessary
given "our open and wide-ranging discovery process," and that
lawyers have good reason to suggest to witnesses that they give
information only in a deposition, in order to protect against the
lawyer who is not representing them and has no obligation to look out for their
interests. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 30.12 at 30-23; see also id. § 30-12,
illus. 30-7 (illustrating the rule with the example that a lawyer representing a
criminal defendant cannot urge the defendant's brother, who is also a suspect, to
refrain from seeking a grant of immunity and testifying against the lawyer's client).
158 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 3.4 cmt. The only sentence in
the commentary specific to subsection (f) explains that requests to a client's
employees are allowed because "the employee may identify his interests with those
of the client." Id. This is followed by a cross-reference to Rule 4.2, which prohibits
lawyers from communicating with a party represented by counsel unless the
person's lawyer consents. That rule bars contacts with some-but not all-
employees of a represented entity. See infra note 180.
159 A Code comparison submitted with the Model Rules suggested that Model
Rule 3.4(f) was similar to DR 7-104(A)(2), which prohibited giving advice to an
unrepresented person whose interests may differ from those of the lawyer's client.
MODEL RULES R. 3.4 Model Code Comparison (1983). The analogy is weak; a
noncooperation request, if openly made in the interest of the lawyer's client, can
hardly be considered "advice." If it were, asking an unrepresented witness to
provide information would be equally impermissible.
160 ABA House of Delegates Transcript, Tape 8, at 47 (Feb. 8, 1983) [hereinafter
ABA Transcript] (on file with author).
161 Explanatory statements filed with the amendments criticized Rule 3.4(f) for
going too far in restricting a lawyer's ability to protect a client's interests, or for
addressing a discovery issue that was better left to the courts. LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 150, at 465-67.
2008]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
risk of witness tampering or other abuses in unmonitored ex
• • • 162
parte interviews. Former ABA President David Brink then
spoke to oppose the amendment. He defended the provision as
supplying "needed guidance to lawyers in an area where they
would otherwise be very much in doubt as to how to proceeds"
and as furthering both "the need for [a]ccess to all useful
information" and the need to protect nonclients from advice that•161
might be contrary to their interests. In the final speech
opposing the amendment, a delegate gave powerful expression
to the rule's value in an era of skyrocketing litigation costs:
[W]e're turning once again here to obligations of attorneys as
officers of the court. This deals with a very, very common way
of suppressing evidence. There are some clients, of course who
can afford to take the depositions of every witness that you
name and [in] some answers to interr[o]gatories, you might
name 30, 40, maybe 100 witnesses. There are other clients who
cannot afford to do that until they determine whether or not
that witness has something pertinent to say about the case.
What you are suggesting in the proposed amendment here is
that you deprive the client of the inexpensive way of finding
out whether or not a deposition is desirable. I suggest this isjust a way which lawyers in the past have used, and if we don't
prevent the lawyers in the future to use to suppress evidence,
to obstruct the paths of justice and to make it more difficult to
get at the heart of the case.' 64
The amendment was then defeated by a voice vote.
165
The Model Rules' legislative history sheds little light on the
intended scope of Rule 8.4(d), the "conduct prejudicial" rule.
The Kutak Commission's proposed final draft omitted the
Code's catch-all prohibitions of conduct "prejudicial to the
administration of justice" or "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation."'6 Hazard, in particular, appears to have
disliked their vagueness and potential for disciiminatory
. 167
enforcement. The National Organization of Bar Counsel, the
162 ABA Transcript, supra note 160, Tape 8, at 48-49, 52 (statement of Michael
Bloom).
163 Id., Tape 8, at 50.
164 Id., Tape 8, at 51-52 (statement of Mr. Carpenter).
165 Id., Tape 8, at 53; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 466.
166 Compare PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 8.4, with MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) & (5) (1981).
167 Later, in his coauthored treatise, Hazard expressed the view that such an
"open-ended rule is dangerous" and gives disciplinary authorities an opening to
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disciplinary enforcers' trade group, lobbied strenuously to keep
the Code provisions, deeming them proven approaches that
were needed to reach the many different forms of conduct that
could reveal a lawyer's unfitness. 68 The commission ultimately
was persuaded to support an amendment offered in the House of
Delegates to include the Code language in Model Rule 8.4. The
matter was voted on very late in a very long day, and the
amendment passed without any substantive discussion. 169 The
official comment to Rule 8.4 was drafted before the "conduct
prejudicial" provision was added and contains no discussion of
it.170
D. Decisions After the Adoption of the Code and Model Rules
Several lines of precedent that have emerged since the ABA's
adoption of its modern ethical codes have addressed, in varying
contexts, the issue of access to witnesses. Disciplinary decisions
and procedural rulings by courts and advisory opinions by ethics
committees have found violations of Model Rule 3.4(f) in a
variety of settings, including requests by prosecutors that
harass unpopular lawyers. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-12; see
also id. § 65.5, at 65-11.
168 See NAT'L ORG. OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REVIEW
COMMITrEE ON THE PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2, 15-16 (June 4, 1982) (on file with author); Schneyer,
supra note 147, at 709-10.
169 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 808-09; ABA Transcript, supra
note 160, Tape 12, at 14-15. Hazard and Hodes's treatise asserts that "[t]he debate
leading to adoption of Rule 8.4(d) by the ABA House of Delegates made clear that
it was intended to address violations of well-understood norms and conventions of
practice only." 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-12. The records of
the House of Delegates meeting, however, reveal no such discussion. A delegate
did rise to oppose a different amendment, which would have forbidden "any other
conduct that adversely reflects" on the lawyer's fitness to practice law,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 810, on the ground that it is "so vague
... [and] provides absolutely no guidance to the lawyer who wants to stay out of
disciplinary difficulty." That amendment failed. ABA Transcript, supra note 160,
Tape 12, at 15-17; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 810. As previously
discussed, the issue of "fair notice" had been of concern to the drafters of the Code
when they came up with "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" as a
replacement for conduct "degrading to the legal profession." See supra text
accompanying note 142.
170 See PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 149, R. 8.4 cmt; MODEL RULES R.
8.4 cmt. (1983).
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witnesses decline defense interviews, 171 attempts by criminal
defense attorneys to convince witnesses not to cooperate with
the prosecution, 72 requests made by lawyers in civil cases that
witnesses not disclose information to an opposing party,
173
requests by one side's lawyer that a witness not speak with the
opposing attorney unless the first lawyer is present at or has
advance notice of the interview, 174 and efforts to dissuade a fact
or expert witness from testifying on behalf of an adversary. 175 A
state supreme court, in imposing a sixty-day suspension on an
attorney who made a noncooperation request, described Rule
3.4(f) as "a vital canon of professional acquittal" whose violation
was a "grievous assault upon the truth-seeking function of the
judicial process." 176 Similar types of requests or inducements
offered to witnesses have been found to constitute conduct
"prejudicial to the administration of justice" under Model Rule
8.4(d) and the equivalent Code provision.
77
The policies favoring unimpeded witness access also have
weighed heavily in decisions interpreting the scope of the ethics
rule that bars a lawyer from communicating with a represented
171 See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 601, 603-04 (10th Cir. 1986);
State Bar of Mich., Ethics Op. RI-302 (1997); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics
and Prof'1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-134 (1999); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 99-14 (1999).
172 See, e.g., In re Alcantara, 676 A.2d 1030, 1034-35 (N.J. 1995); State Bar of
Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 23
(1995); cf. State Bar of Mich., Ethics Op. RI-302 (1997).
173 See, e.g., Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (8th Cir. 1993); Briggs v.
McWeeny, 796 A.2d 516, 523-24, 540 (Conn. 2002); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993); cf Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp.
1186, 1216-17 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (finding no Rule 3.4(f) violation where letter
merely informed former employees of their right not to be interviewed and did not
"constitute an inducement not to voluntarily provide information").
174 See, e.g., Davis v. Dow Corning Corp., 530 N.W.2d 178, 179, 181 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-14 (1999); cf. Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-11, 1990 Del. Super.
LEXIS 346 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1990) (not ruling on whether such conduct
violated Rule 3.4(f) but referring the matter to Delaware's Disciplinary Counsel).
175 See, e.g., Harlan, 982 F.2d at 1257-59; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Cox, 48
P.3d 780, 785-86 (Okla. 2002); cf. In re Kornreich, 693 A.2d 877, 878, 883 (N.J.
1997) (disciplining attorney who violated Rule 3.4(f) by attempting to dissuade a
person from appearing in court).
176 Cox, 48 P.3d at 786.
177 See cases cited infra note 254; see also Alcantara, 676 A.2d at 1034-35 (finding
that statements urging witness noncooperation violated Rule 8.4(d) as well as
3.4(f)).
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person or entity unless that party's lawyer consents. 17  When an
attorney is investigating a claim against a corporation -or
government agency, the no-contact rule has the potential to
stand as a wholesale barrier to informal interviews if it is read to
cover current or former employees of the organization. 7 9 Most
of the decisions by courts and ethics committees have construed
the rule narrowly to allow ex parte interviews of all former
employees and many categories of current employees.18°
Considerations of both efficiency and the truth-seeking goals of
adversary litigation feature prominently in the justifications
given for this result. For example, in Niesig v. Team 1,18 New
York's highest court cited the need to preserve "avenues of
informal discovery ... that may serve both the litigants and the
entire justice system by uncovering relevant facts, thus
178 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2008); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1981).
179 See generally Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from
a Litigant's Former Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical
Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868
(2003); Jerome N. Krulewitch, Comment, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate
Parties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of
Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1274 (1988). The ABA's ethics committee, as
we have seen, dealt with this problem in 1934 and concluded that the policies
favoring unimpeded access to witnesses should prevail, at least in situations where
the represented employer is an individual. See Formal Op. 117, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 102-04. Subsequent interpretations of the rule by ABA code
drafters, ethics committees, and courts have taken into account that corporate
entities can only act through their employees and agents; if the rule shielding a
represented party from contacts from an opposing lawyer is to mean anything for
them, it must extend to at least some employees. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2
(1983); John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The
Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 695 (1979).
180 The decisions are not uniform, but this has been the strong general trend. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 100 reporter's note
(2000) (reviewing differing positions taken by courts and ethics authorities). In
2002, the ABA sought to bring clarity to this area by revising the official comment
to Model Rule 4.2, which had been highly confusing in its original version. The
revised comment provides that the rule does not apply at all to former employees
and that current employees are covered only if they supervise or regularly consult
with the organization's lawyer regarding the matter in question, have authority to
bind the organization with respect to the matter, or are persons whose acts or
omissions in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2
cmt. 7 (2008).
181 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990)
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promoting the expeditious resolution of disputes. 18 2 The court
invoked Hickman v. Taylor and the Second Circuit's Edelstein
decision in arguing that ex parte interviews serve justice by
allowing the lawyers for each side to develop and refine
competing versions of the facts in private. "Costly formal
depositions that may deter litigants with limited resources, or...
interviews attended by adversary counsel, are no substitute for
... off-the-record private efforts to learn and assemble, rather
than perpetuate, information."' 84
The idea that the administration of justice is harmed by
agreements that restrict a witness's freedom to disclose
information relevant to other cases is the central theme in a
large and growing body of case law finding such agreements
unenforceable. In EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc.,85 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting an
employer from using noncooperation clauses to prevent
employees who had settled sexual harassment claims from
making voluntary disclosures to the EEOC, which was
investigating similar complaints against the company. The court
found such agreements contrary to public policy and
unenforceable. 86 Astra's argument that the EEOC could obtain
182 Id. at 1034.
183 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 112-14, 120-23 (discussing
Hickman and Edelstein, respectively).
184 Niesig, 553 N.E.2d at 1034. For similarly reasoned opinions, see, e.g., Cram v.
Lamson & Sessions Co., Carlon Div., 148 F.R.D. 259, 261-62 (S.D. Iowa 1993);
Siguel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., No. 88-0626-Y, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2775 (D. Mass.
Mar. 12, 1990); Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 797 N.E.2d 905, 909-
11 (Mass. 2003); Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., 59 P.3d 1237, 1242, 1248 (Nev.
2002); Wis. State Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. E-07-01 (2007). The Supreme
Court of Washington has pushed the principle a step further, holding that in
situations where the no-contact rule does not prohibit a plaintiff's attorney from
interviewing the defendant's employees, it is impermissible for the defendant to
instruct its employees not to meet with opposing counsel. See Wright v. Group
Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984). In a similar vein, the New York
Court of Appeals recently ruled that a plaintiff who puts her medical condition in
issue cannot interfere with defense counsel's ability to privately interview the
plaintiff's treating physician by refusing to sign a HIPAA authorization. See Arons
v. Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831, 837-38 (N.Y. 2007).
185 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996).
186 See id. at 744-45. The harm caused by impeding the EEOC's ability to
effectively investigate employment discrimination was held to outweigh any
detriment to the public interest in promoting settlements. The court found it
unlikely that the unavailability of a nonassistance provision would create any
substantial disincentive to settlement. See id. at 744.
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the employees' testimony by issuing subpoenas was rejected on
the grounds that public policy favors a "free flow of
information" to an agency charged with vindicating wrongs.17
Requiring the agency to resort to its subpoena power would
"stultify investigations" and "significantly increase the time and
expense of a probe."'1 88  Other decisions have invalidated
settlement provisions that impeded voluntary cooperation with
the EEOC or other agencies on similar public policy grounds, '8 9
or based on statutes prohibiting retaliation against a person who
takes part in an investigation or enforcement proceeding.'9 0
The same ideas are at work in decisions upholding claims by
employees who were discharged or disciplined for their
willingness to testify on behalf of private parties in litigation.
Testimony by public employees has been accorded First
Amendment protection against employer retaliation on the
theory that uninhibited witness testimony is essential to the
187 Id. at 745.
188 Id.
189 See EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., No. 01 C 4427, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2003); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ. 8421, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17484 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002) (following Astra and holding
confidentiality agreements preventing voluntary disclosures to EEOC to be void as
against public policy); Lana C. v. Cameron P., 108 P.3d 896, 902 (Alaska 2005)
(voiding child custody settlement insofar as it prevented mother from disclosing
past child abuse allegations against.father in a domestic violence petition, because
agreements "preventing an individual from providing evidence relevant to litigation
or investigations are contrary to public policy"); Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 196 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 876 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding stipulated gag order that barred disclosures
to state medical board concerning doctor's molestation of minors void because
contrary to public policy).
.190 See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 85 F.3d 89, 94-96 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that employer violated Energy Reorganization Act's antiretaliation
provision by conditioning settlement of employee's claim on agreement that would
preclude his voluntary appearance as a witness in judicial or administrative
proceedings); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 671 F. Supp. 351, 357-58 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(construing ADEA's antiretaliation provision to bar enforcement of clause in
retirement agreement that prohibited assisting others in the prosecution of any age
discrimination claim); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 390 F. Supp. 1126, 1128
(E.D. Wis. 1975) (finding employer's use of confidentiality policy to bar employees
from speaking with Justice Department attorneys unlawful retaliation under Title
VII); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance
on Non-Waiveable Employee Rights (April 10, 1997), available at
http:llwww.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html. But see EEOC v. SunDance Rehab.
Corp., 466 F.3d 490 (6th Cit. 2006) (holding that company did not violate
antiretaliation statutes by offering separation agreements that could penalize
voluntary disclosures to EEOC, although these provisions might well be
unenforceable).
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justice system's proper functioning.'91 Antiretaliation provisions
of discrimination laws have been construed to protect those who
provide information to private litigants and offer to testify on
their behalf, based on the idea that effective enforcement
depends on the initiative of individual plaintiffs and their "access
to the unchilled testimony of witnesses."' 92
The idea that obstructing access to relevant witness testimony
is prejudicial to the administration of justice has been the
linchpin of decisions addressing noncooperation clauses in the
context of discovery disputes. The leading cases are Kalinauskas
v. Wong193 and Wendt v. Walden University, Inc. ,194 both of which
involved efforts by the defendant in a sex discrimination suit to
prevent the plaintiff from seeking deposition testimony from
former employees who had entered into settlement agreements
with secrecy provisions. In Kalinauskas, the court weighed the
public policy of encouraging settlement against the danger that a
defendant could use a secrecy agreement to hide relevant factual
information from others whom it injures through similar
misconduct, and concluded that "settlement agreements which
suppress evidence violate the greater public policy.,1 95  The
Wendt court gave pithy expression to the principle: "Defendants
should not be able to buy the silence of witnesses with a
settlement agreement when the facts of one controversy are
relevant to another.' ' 196  These cases, and others that have
followed them, allow discovery of potentially relevant factual
information that underlies a settled case, and declare any
contractual agreement that would penalize a witness for making
such disclosure to be void.197
191 See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578
(5th Cir. 1989).
192 Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,.420 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999)).
193 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993).
194 No. 4-95-467, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 1996).
195 Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 367.
196 Wendt, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720, at *5.
197 See Sparks v. Seltzer, No. 05-CV-1061, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61398, at *13-
*14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006); Channelmark Corp. v. Destination Prods. Int'l, Inc.,
No. 99 C 214, 2000 WL 968818 (N.D. I11. July 7, 2000); Hamad v. Graphic Arts Ctr.,
Inc., No. CIV 96-216-FR, 1997 WL 12955 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 1997); McKnight v. Stein
Mart, Inc., No. 95-0258, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12581 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 1996);
Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Scott v.
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The principle has been extended to voluntary, ex parte
witness interviews conducted outside the formal discovery
process. In In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Securities Litigation,198 the
lead plaintiff moved to have confidentiality agreements signed
by the defendant's former employees declared void as against
public policy to the extent that the agreements interfered with
the ability of the plaintiff's lawyers and investigators to interview
them about matters relevant to the litigation. 199  A federal
magistrate judge agreed, holding that it would be contrary to
public policy to allow employers to "muzzle" ex-employees with
agreements that prevent them from assisting private litigants
who are seeking to vindicate federally protected rights.200 While
the defendant could properly use a confidentiality agreement to
safeguard privileged information or trade secrets, the
"whistleblower-type information about allegedly unlawful acts"
sought by the plaintiff did not fall into these categories.2°' The
company had no right to "use its confidentiality agreements to
chill former employees from voluntarily participating in
legitimate investigations into alleged wrongdoing" and could not
prevent them from meeting privately with plaintiff's counsel to
202provide relevant information. Other decisions have used
Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co.,
845 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002); cf Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
U.S. 222 (1998) (holding that judgment issued by a state court barring a witness
from giving testimony could not operate to prevent parties in litigation before
another state's courts from taking witness's deposition). A few decisions have
refused to allow discovery of information covered by a confidentiality agreement in
situations where the facts underlying the settled case were found by the court to be
irrelevant, or of very little relevance, to the current proceeding. See Hasbrouck v.-
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 460-62 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Flynn v.
Portland Gen. Elec. Corp., No. 88-455-FR, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11219 (D. Or.
Sept. 21, 1989).
198 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
199 See id. at 1129-32. At the time the motion was filed, formal discovery was
unavailable because of a provision in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 that stays all discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending. See id. at 1132-
34.
200 See id. at 1136-37.
201 Id. at 1135.
202 Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1133. A federal district court in another case upheld
and enforced a nondisclosure agreement that was limited to trade secrets and other
traditionally protected commercial information, rejecting a former employee's
claim that he had a right to volunteer information about defective gambling
equipment to a company suing his former employer for breach of contract. See
Saini v. Int'l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916-17, 924-25 (D. Nev. 2006). The
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similar reasoning to void confidentiality agreements that
prevented a plaintiff's lawyer from conducting ex parte
interviews or predeposition conversations with witnesses in cases
brought under federal employment statutes. °3
The principle that litigants and their attorneys should be able
to conduct ex parte interviews with willing witnesses to gather
evidence in support of their claims, free of adversary
interference, has a long history, with its roots in early twentieth-
century ABA ethical pronouncements that have been carried
forward into the modern professional conduct rules, and a long
line of judicial decisions aimed at preserving witness access and
invalidating attempts to block it. The principle rests on the idea
that when lawyers seek to ascertain the facts from witnesses,
they perform a function essential to the administration of justice.
Ex parte witness interviews serve the adjudicatory system by
allowing each party to get at the unvarnished facts, shape those
facts into a persuasive presentation, and present competing
versions of the truth to the tribunal. Witnesses are free agents
and may decline to be interviewed, but adversary interference
with a witness's decision whether or not to cooperate
undermines the principles of fair competition on which the
system depends. Witnesses do not belong to either side in a
dispute, and neither side should be able to claim or create a
property interest in their testimony. Noncooperation
settlements increase the costs to adversaries, public agencies,
court viewed JDS Uniphase and similar cases as "persuasive authority," id. at 920,
but found their principle inapplicable when the disclosure implicated trade secrets,
the former employee initiated the disclosure rather than being asked for
information as part of an agency's or litigant's investigation, and the disclosure did
not expose illegal or harmful activities of public concern. See id. at 921-23.
203 See Hoffman v. Sbarro, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4484, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 444-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Hoffman, a federal magistrate judge ruled that a nondisclosure
agreement signed by the defendant's current and former employees could not be
used to prevent plaintiffs' counsel from interviewing them about the wage practices
at issue in the litigation. See Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *4. In
Chambers, an age discrimination suit, the court found that confidentiality
agreements signed by former employees would adversely affect the plaintiff's ability
to gather relevant information and held that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
"it is against public policy for parties to agree not to reveal, at least in the limited
contexts of depositions or pre-deposition interviews concerning litigation arising
under federal law, facts relating to alleged or potential violations of such law."
Chambers, 159 F.R.D. at 444 (footnote omitted).
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and the courts of getting at the facts, undermining both the
system's efficiency and its effectiveness in determining the truth
and adjudicating cases fairly.
IV
APPLYING THE MODEL RULES TO SETTLEMENT SECRECY
AGREEMENTS
A. How to Read the Rules
Before addressing the specifics of what the ethics rules mean
for settlements with noncooperation requirements, the broader
question of how to go about interpreting the rules requires some
attention. The ethics rules are a binding code for lawyers, and
violations can lead to disciplinary sanctions. In this sense, they
are a form of legislation, and the tools ordinarily used to
construe statutes-considerations of text, structure, and
205purpose-can appropriately be used. It would be a mistake,
however, to treat the ethics rules like criminal statutes and apply
a presumption that ambiguities should be construed in favor of
204 The progression from Canons to Model Code to Model Rules has been
marked by a movement away from broad statements of ethical standards and
aspirations in favor of concrete and enforceable rules. See generally Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249-60 (1991); David
Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 41-53 (1995); Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and
Regeneration of Ethics, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 953, 953-60 (1980).
205 Lawyers' ethical codes differ from ordinary legislation in the sense that they
are drafted by the ABA, a private body that has no legislative authority. However,
it is reasonable to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that when a
particular jurisdiction adopts the ABA's rules, it shares the ABA's intent.
Disciplinary rules also differ from legislation in the sense that the regulation of
attorney conduct has long been recognized as an inherent judicial power. In
interpreting the rules that they themselves have enacted, courts may feel freer to
make their own policy choices than when dealing with legislation enacted by a
separate branch of government. See Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y.
1990) (noting that when interpreting professional conduct rules adopted as "the
legal profession's document of self-governance," as opposed to statutes passed by
"a coequal branch of government," courts are "not constrained to read the rules
literally or effectuate the intent of the drafters, but [may] look to the rules as
guidelines to be applied with due regard for the broad range of interests at stake");
Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical
Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485,534-42 (1989).
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the accused. 206 That approach would invite lawyers to push the
boundaries of the rules wherever possible to maximize
advantage for their clients or themselves207 and is inconsistent
with the premises of professional self-regulation.
Society's grant of self-governance to the legal profession
"carries with it," in the words of the Model Rules' preamble, "a
responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the
public interest" and "properly applied" to fulfill lawyers' role in
208this social compact. It follows that "[t]he Rules of Professional
Conduct are rules of reason" that "should be interpreted with
reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law
itself., 20 9 When there is ambiguity as to how the rules apply in a
given situation, lawyers are required to "exercise . . . sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the Rules., 210 Consistent with this framework, courts
enforcing the rules have generally eschewed narrow-construction
canons of interpretation in favor of an approach that construes
ambiguities in light of the purposes a rule is designed to serve.211
206 See Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 122 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the "rule
of lenity" applicable to criminal cases does not apply to bar disciplinary
proceedings, which are quasi-judicial in nature).
207 See Luban & Millemann, supra note 204, at 57 (arguing that the penal code-
like appearance of the Model Rules invites lawyers to "push the edges of the
envelope" in construing the limits of what they may do on behalf of clients or to
maximize their own income); Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75
IOWA L. REV. 975, 977-78 (1990) (discussing the strong pressures lawyers face to
resolve all ethical doubts in favor of the client).
208 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. paras. 12-13 (2008); see also
Schneyer, supra note 147, at 695-96 (discussing the Kutak Commission's "vision of
the Model Rules as a professional covenant with the public").
209 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 14 (2008). The influential
1958 report written by Lon Fuller and John Randall, as cochairs of a joint
committee of the ABA and the Association of American Law Schools, similarly
cautioned that "a letter-bound observance of the Canons is not equivalent to the
practice of professional responsibility," which "must derive from an understanding
of the reasons that lie back of specific restraints." Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall,
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159
(1958) [hereinafter Joint Conference Report].
210 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (2008).
211 See, e.g., EEOC v. HORA, Inc., No. 03-CV-1429, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11279, at *34 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005) (noting, in disqualifying lawyer for various rule
violations, that even if the application of the rules to her conduct was unsettled,
"calculating one's behavior to merely comply with the wording of -the professional
rules, while doing violence to their spirit, is fundamentally inconsistent with a
lawyer's responsibilities to the parties, to the community at large and to the
[c]ourt"); Fla. Bar v. Machin, 635 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1994) (disciplining attorney
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What can the purposes of legal representation tell us about
the application of the ethics rules to settlements requiring
witness noncooperation? The lawyer's role as client advocate,
with its hallmark duties of loyalty and zeal, would appear to
support a narrow reading that allows lawyers to negotiate any
lawful settlement terms which serve client interests, while a
lawyer's duties as an "officer of the legal system, 212 would cut in
favor a broad construction that forbids lawyer participation in
agreements that impair the truth-seeking function of
adjudication. The Model Rules' preamble treats the lawyer's
roles as a client representative and officer of the court as equal
in importance and generally complementary.2 3 For the "difficult
ethical problems" that arise when they conflict, lawyers are told
to consult the "terms for resolving such conflicts" embodied in
particular rules, and how the balance has been struck in "the
214framework of these Rules" as a whole. Accordingly, we need
to examine the theory that underlies the policy choices that the
rule drafters made in deciding when duties to the legal system
should trump obligations to the client, and consider the place of
the rule prohibiting witness noncooperation requests within the
framework of those principles.
There are two basic stories that can be told about the Model
215Rules' vision of lawyers as officers of the court. The plot line
of the first story runs roughly as follows. The Kutak
Commission set out with high aspirations to expand lawyers'
for seeking to induce crime victim not to testify at sentencing hearing and citing the
preamble in finding that, even in the absence of a clear prohibition spelled out in a
rule or binding precedent, a lawyer is responsible for using sound judgment that is
guided by the Model Rules' purposes).
212 "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients,
an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2008).
213 See id. para. 8.
214 Id. para. 9.
215 The vision that had been articulated in the Model Code was a very thin one,
essentially treating a lawyer's client-centered and systemic duties as being one and
the same: "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law .... MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981) (footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, the
Code included some limits on advocacy, designed to codify certain obligations of
lawyers as officers of the court, that went beyond merely prohibiting the illegal. See
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 49-61
(1989) (listing and assessing such obligations under the Code).
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obligations as court officers. Its membership included Judge
Marvin Frankel, who had prominently advocated changing the
priorities of legal ethics to make its defining principle the
ascertainment of truth, rather than the advancement of client
interests. 216 The commission's initial drafts217 would have created
radical new duties, including requirements that lawyers disclose
material adverse facts and law to the tribunal, treat other
litigants fairly, exercise restraint in litigation tactics, and provide
unpaid legal services for the public good.218  These proposals
produced a flood of criticism from the organized bar, and the
ABA retreated, in the end requiring little more of lawyers than
219that they not participate in criminal or fraudulent conduct.
The second story is the one told by Robert Kutak himself, in
an essay that he wrote shortly before his death in 1983. 220 Kutak
acknowledged that the commission had made significant changes
216 See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031 (1975). For discussion of the apparent influence of Frankel and other
critics of adversary ethics on the Kutak Commission's early drafts, see Schneyer,
supra note 147, at 700-01; James H. Stark, Review Essay, The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REV. 948, 972-73 (1980).
217 These included the officially published discussion draft, supra note 148, and an
earlier draft that was leaked to the press. Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code
Rewrite Committee, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Aug. 27, 1979, at 26.
218 The discussion draft's reception in the press emphasized and largely welcomed
the expansion of the lawyer's role as an officer of the court. See Schneyer, supra
note 147, at 696. The New York Times described it as setting out "fundamentally to
alter" lawyers' duties to clients by requiring that increased weight be given to "the
duty to be fair and candid toward all other participants in the legal system, even
adversaries." Id., quoting Linda Greenhouse, Lawyers' Group Offers a Revision in
Code of Ethics: Draft Says Client Interests Could Be Placed Second, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1980, at 6.
219 Versions of this story can be found in ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 53, at
106-07; Gaetke, supra note 215, at 69-71; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives
on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 600-01 (1985); Stark, supra note 216, at
964-80; Jill M. Dennis, Note, The Model Rules and the Search for Truth: The
Origins and Applications of Model Rule 3.3(d), 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 157, 160-
65 (1994). Ted Schneyer, in his superb study of the Model Rules' drafting and
adoption, gives an account that also portrays the Model Rules as the product of
political struggles and compromises among different segments of the bar and
competing conceptions of legal ethics. Schneyer, however, sees the end result as
reflecting no single outlook, rather than representing a victory by forces favoring a
"hired-gun" ethos. See generally Schneyer, supra note 147.
220 Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 172 (David Luban ed.,
1983). Kutak sounded similar themes in his introduction to the commission's
proposed final draft.
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in response to the heated criticism its initial proposals received.
However, he insisted that the choices the commission ultimately
made were not the product of unprincipled political
compromise, but instead reflected "an earnest desire to find
coherent and workable solutions" in conformity with lawyers'
221
roles as both client representatives and officers of the court.
The contours of the officer-of-the-court duties in the
commission's final product rested, in' Kutak's view, on the
"competitive theory, 222 that underlies our nation's legal,
political, and economic institutions. One fundamental tenet of
this ideology is that "competing individuals have no legal
responsibility for the competence of their counterparts on the
other side of the transaction and, consequently, have no
obligation to share the benefits of their own competence with
the other side., 223 Since "individual competencies in employing
a given process may vary," it is understood that competitive
processes "will not in every instance guarantee a correct result or
in every case advance the common interest"; instead, the system
is justified by a belief that, in the aggregate, it produces more
224
correct outcomes than alternative approaches. Accordingly,
competitors in an adversary system have no general duty to act
for the benefit of others, volunteer adverse information, or
ensure just results. 225 At the same time, "[u]nderlying the basic
theory that free competition.., will maximize good results is the
assumption that the process of competition is not distorted by
conduct that bears no relationship to individual competence.,
226
Thus, force and bribery are unacceptable as tools of competition.
While there is no general duty to disclose, information that is
volunteered cannot be false or deceptive. "[T]hose who are not
sufficiently competent to ask the right questions" are out of luck,
221 Id. at 172-73; see also Robert J. Kutak, Chairman's Introduction to PROPOSED
FINAL DRAFt, supra note 149, at i, ii.
222 Kutak, supra riote 220 at 174.
223 Id. Justice Jackson relied on the same basic conception in Hickman v. Taylor
to justify the Court's holding that attorney work product should be shielded from
disclosure: "[A] common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding.
Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its
functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." 329 U.S.
495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
224 Kutak, supra note 220, at 174.
225 Id. at 174-75.
226 Id. at 175.
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but the person who asks the right questions "is entitled to the
227fruits of that competence" in the form of an honest answer.
Information that is relevant to a matter "cannot be concealed or
destroyed with the purpose of preventing its availability., 2 8
In the remainder of the essay, Kutak focused on how this
general theory shaped the approach taken in the Model RulesS 229
toward issues of confidentiality and candor. It also helps to
account-which the first story fails to do-for the presence in
the Rules of a variety of other duties that favor systemic over
230client interests and go beyond the requirements of other law.
For example, in ex parte proceedings before a tribunal, an
attorney is obliged to disclose all material facts, even adverse231
ones, a departure from the nondisclosure norm that can be
justified under the competitive theory because the adversary is
deprived of any opportunity to benefit from its own competence
by presenting its side of the story. Statements to the media that
are likely to materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding are
prohibited, because parties should only be able to benefit from
227 Id.
228 Id. at 176. The idea that limitations on advocacy can be derived from the
premises of the adversary system is not unique to the Kutak Commission. The 1958
report of the ABA-AALS Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility made an
eloquent case for "the limits partisan advocacy must impose on itself if it is to
remain wholesome and useful" in achieving its purposes. Joint Conference Report,
supra note 209, at 1160. Eleanor Holmes Norton proposed a "functionalist model
for negotiation ethics" that derives ethical limits from a conception of bargaining as
an adversarial market process whose purpose is to achieve valid agreements. See
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493, 525-41 (1989). More recently, Robert Gordon has argued that a lawyer's role
as an agent for clients in a system designed to provide a public framework for
securing rights gives rise to an obligation to refrain from overly adversarial strategic
behavior that undermines the system's effectiveness. See Robert W. Gordon, Why
Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 42 (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 2000).
229 See Kutak, supra note 220, at 178-87.
230 See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 264 (1985) (noting that, even
after discounting obligations that are either illusory or required by other law, the
Model Rules contain a number of mandatory duties that are best explained as
"duties imposed in the interest of safeguarding the boundaries of adversary justice,"
which "protect the dominant jurisprudential model for dispute resolution and
interest reconciliation by forbidding behavior that seeks to skirt its principles").
231 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2008); see also Dennis, supra
note 219. The ban on ex parte communications with a judge or juror during an
adjudicative proceeding performs a similar function. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2008).
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competence exercised within the channels of adversary
232
adjudication. Rules that prohibit direct communication with
233
another lawyer's client, restrict dealings with unrepresented
234persons, and forbid settlements that make a lawyer's services
235
unavailable to future clients are all designed to ensure that
people have the opportunity to benefit from legal
representation, which is often a prerequisite to competent
236participation in the adversary process.
Rule 3.4(f)'s prohibition of witness noncooperation requests
also fits comfortably into the framework of the competitive
theory. The official comment to Model Rule 3.4 begins by
noting that the rule's prohibitions are designed to secure "[f]air
competition" in an adversary system that "contemplates that the
evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the
contending parties., 237 A system that depends on competitive
marshaling and presentation of the facts needs to ensure that
232 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.6 (2008). Other rules address
the danger that personal influence, rather than competence in arguing the facts and
the law, will sway the adjudicator. See id. R. 3.4(e) (prohibiting lawyers from
asserting personal knowledge of facts or stating a personal opinion as to the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a litigant, or the justness of a cause at
trial); R. 3.7 (generally prohibiting lawyers from serving as a witness and an
advocate in the same case).
233 Id. R. 4.2.
234 Id. R. 4.3 & cmt. 1 (requiring that a lawyer not give any legal advice to an
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if there is a
reasonable possibility of conflicting interests, and generally requiring the lawyer to
disclose that she is acting on behalf of a client).
235 Id. R. 5.6(b) & cmt. 2 (prohibiting a lawyer from participating in offering or
making a settlement agreement in which the lawyer agrees not to represent other
persons).
236 As a foundation for an ethical code, the competitive theory leaves much to be
desired. Its assumption that zealous advocacy, untempered by any responsibility to
account for whether the other side's claims are being competently presented, will
achieve just outcomes in the long run, is hard to defend when many disputants lack
the resources to obtain legal representation. Although the Model Rules' preamble
acknowledges that it is only "when an opposing party is well represented [that] a
lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume
that justice is being done," id. pmbl. para. 8, the Model Rules create no duty either
to assure that the other side is well represented or to assume greater responsibility
for achieving a just result when that condition does not hold. See generally RHODE,
supra note 77, at 55-56; SIMON, supra note 75, at 139-42. My argument here is
simply that the "competitive theory" does a reasonably good job of accounting for
the systemic duties that the Rules do recognize, and provides insight into the
purposes that those rules are designed to achieve.
237 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (2008).
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litigants have a fair opportunity to obtain them. Voluntary
cooperation by witnesses enhances the effectiveness of parties'
presentations of their claims by allowing them to probe and
develop potential testimony before deciding whether to use it-
and whether to file suit in the first place. In a competitive
system, disputants and their attorneys should be able to reap the
benefits of their initiative and competence by interviewing
willing witnesses. While a witness is free to decline informal
interviews, neither side to a dispute should be able to exercise
influence or offer inducements to deprive an adversary of access.
These arguments for a principle of access to ex parte witness
interviews date back to the time of the ABA Canons and Formal
Opinion 131, and have been invoked by courts since the time of
Hickman v. Taylor.238
Thus, the principle embodied in Rule 3.4(f) should not be
viewed as an oddball exception to the client-centered duties that
are at the core of the ethics rules. As with many of the non-
client-focused duties that the Model Rules recognize, it can best
be understood as a product of the competitive theory that
underlies lawyers' ethical obligations. In itself, this does not
answer the question of how broadly the rule should be read.
Expansive construction of a rule designed to preserve the
adversary system's proper functioning might sometimes threaten
other core values protected by the Rules. For example, the
requirement that a lawyer report client perjury to the court 2 39 is
aimed at preserving the integrity of adversary adjudication, but it
also has the potential to undermine the purposes served by
confidentiality by making clients less likely to disclose
information to their lawyers. Furthermore, an erroneous report
of perjury to the court may cause grave injustice to the client.
These concerns could justify a fairly narrow interpretation of the
238 That Rule 3.4(f) fits comfortably into an adversary-system-based conception
of lawyers' ethics is confirmed by the inclusion of a similar prohibition in the
alternative ethics code that was put forward by the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America. ATLA had strongly criticized the proposed Model Rules for being
inconsistent with the values of the adversary system and insufficiently protective of
clients' rights. See THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (1982),
reprinted in 2002 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 419
(Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 2002). Rule 3.5 in the American
Lawyer's Code provided that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . discourage a
witness or potential witness from talking to counsel for another party." Id. at 433.
239 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2008).
[Vol. 87,481
Buying Witness Silence
rule's requirement that the lawyer know that the testimony was
false, so that any reasonable doubt is resolved in the client's
favor.240 No risks of a similar magnitude are posed by a broad
reading of the rule banning witness noncooperation requests.
All rules that restrict the permissible means for achieving clients'
ends infringe to some degree on the principle of client
autonomy. The particular interest impaired here-the client's
ability to request or demand noncooperation from a witness-
represents a very modest intrusion on the client's freedom, and
is not associated with fundamental rights such as the right to
testify on one's own behalf. A liberal construction that resolves
doubts in favor of achieving the rule's intended purposes is
therefore warranted.
B. The Contours of the Rules Against Requesting
Noncooperation in the Context of Settlement
1. Settlements Are Not Exempt
The basic issue of whether Model Rule 3.4(f) applies to
noncooperation requests made in settlement proposals presents
no difficult issues of interpretation; it rests on a straightforward
application of the rule's language. Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer
from "request[ing] a person other than a client to refrain from
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party" unless
the person falls into one of the excepted categories. 2 41  It
contains no exception for requests made to an opposing party in
the course of settlement negotiations. In the only state ethics
opinion to address the issue thus far, South Carolina's bar ethics
committee concluded that the rule, by its plain terms, prohibits a
defense lawyer from conditioning a settlement offer on the
plaintiff agreeing not to voluntarily provide relevant information
to other parties suing the same defendant.242
Courts sometimes refuse to apply the literal language of a rule
to avoid absurd results that the drafters could not possibly have
240 See generally Lauren Gilbert, Facing Justice: Ethical Choices in Representing
Immigrant Clients, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (2007) (analyzing an attorney's
ethical choices in deciding whether to disclose misrepresentations to the tribunal).
241 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008).
242 See S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993).
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intended,24 ' but Rule 3.4(f)'s rationales apply just as strongly in
the settlement context as in other settings. If merely asking a
person to refrain from voluntarily disclosing relevant
information to other parties is unethical, offering payment in
exchange for a binding promise is worse still. If a lawyer
approached a nonparty witness and said, "I'll pay you five
thousand dollars if you agree not to cooperate with anyone
who's suing my client," unquestionably the rule would be
violated.244 That the recipient of a noncooperation request
happens to be a plaintiff suing.the lawyer's client is irrelevant to
the rule's purposes; it is precisely because the plaintiff is a
potential witness in other cases, and to influence her behavior in
that capacity, that the request is being made. The fact that the
ethics rules, and the law in general, encourage the settlement of
disputes cannot mean that conduct expressly prohibited by the
rules becomes permissible simply because it helps bring about a
245
settlement.
Whether conduct that violates Rule 3.4(f) is also prohibited
under the rule that bars lawyers from engaging in "conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice ' '246 is of littlepractical significance in the vast majority of jurisdictions because
243 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
244 The commentary to the provision based on Rule 3.4(f) in the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers states, "A lawyer may not offer threats or financial or
other inducements to a witness not to cooperate with another party."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. c (2000).
245 Cf. Gillers, supra note 10, at 14-15 (discussing why the public policy of
promoting settlement does not make noncooperation agreements exempt from
obstruction of justice laws). In situations where the Model Rules' drafters were
concerned that a rule might be misread to interfere with legitimate settlement
practices, they took pains to guard against this in the official commentary. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. 2 (2008) (clarifying that the
prohibition against giving legal advice to an unrepresented person does not prohibit
informing a pro se adverse party of the terms on which the lawyer's client is willing
to settle and explaining the lawyer's view of the meaning of proposed settlement
terms); id. R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (stating that some conventional negotiation ploys, such as
exaggerating "a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement," ordinarily are not
understood as "statements of material fact" and therefore do not violate the rule on
lawyer truthfulness). The comments to Model Rule 3.4(f), in contrast, are devoid of
any indication that the rule should not be applied to settlements.
246 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981).
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247Rule 3.4(f) has been nearly universally adopted. But it is
important to an issue that I will take up in the next section:
whether it is unethical for a plaintiff's lawyer to negotiate a
settlement requiring the plaintiff not to cooperate in other
proceedings.248  Before reaching that issue, it is necessary to
consider the scope of the "conduct prejudicial" rule.
247 California, New York, and Maine, the three remaining states with ethics codes
not based on the Model Rules, have not adopted Model Rule 3.4(f). California also
never adopted the "conduct prejudicial" rule, but, as previously discussed, its rule
against the secretion of witnesses may prohibit witness noncooperation requests,
and its state bar has proposed adopting Model Rule 3.4(f). See supra note 139 and
accompanying text. The ethics codes in New York and Maine include the ABA's
"conduct prejudicial" rule. See ME. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.2(f)(4)
(2008); N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (2007).
Maine has adopted a version of the Model Rules, including Rule 3.4(f), that will go
into effect in August 2009. See ME. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2009).
New York's judiciary recently promulgated a new set of attorney conduct rules,
effective April 1, 2009, that follow the numbering system of the Model Rules, but in
substance are an amalgam of provisions carried forward from New York's version
of the Model Code and language drawn from the Model Rules. See N.Y. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT (2008); 24 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Prof'l Conduct 666
(Dec. 24, 2008). Although Rule 3.4(f) had been included in a set of proposed rules
put forward by the New York State Bar Association, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n,
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Proposed N.Y.
Rules], R. 3.4(f), the final rules omit it. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.4 (2008). Because the judicial board that adopted the rules gave no explanations
for its changes, it is unclear whether the proposed rule was rejected for being too
restrictive; too permissive, or simply unnecessary in light of other prohibitions,
including the "conduct prejudicial" rule.
Three other Model Rules jurisdictions have not adopted Model Rule 3.4(f). In
Washington state, the official commentary to Rule 3.4 indicates that subsection (f)
was not adopted because its exception for requests made to a client's employees
was too broad in light of a state supreme court decision finding such requests
improper. The comment also states that noncooperation requests may violate Rule
8.4(d), the "conduct prejudicial" rule. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.4 cmt. 5 (2006) (citing Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984)).
Oregon has retained the language of the Code's witness secretion rule in its version
of the Model Rules, instead of the ABA's Rule 3.4(f). See OR. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2006). A state ethics opinion holds that attempting to dissuade
a witness from testifying on behalf of an adversary violates Oregon's "conduct
prejudicial" rule, id. R. 8.4(a)(4), and may run afoul of the witness secretion rule as
well. See Or. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2005-132 (2005). Kentucky's version of
the Model Rules omits both Rule 3.4(f) and Rule 8.4(d). See KY. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.130 (2008). A handful of other states have made changes from the
ABA's version of Model Rule.3.4(f) which I will discuss when relevant to particular
interpretive issues.
248 Rule 3.4(f) prohibits only noncooperation requests made to "a person other
than a client," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008), and therefore
does not apply to this situation.
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The rule's extremely broad language poses an interpretive
problem. Its inclusion in the Model Code and Model Rules
reflects a judgment that specifically framed rules cannot capture
the entire universe of lawyer conduct that is unethical and
deserving of discipline.249 To limit the rule to behavior that is
illegal would make it redundant and undermine its purpose. On
the other hand, the undefined nature of the duty raises concern
that attorneys may face discipline without fair notice that their
conduct was improper, and poses the danger of selective
250
enforcement against attorneys pursuing unpopular causes.
Courts have resolved these competing concerns by upholding the
rule's application, even in the absence of a violation of an
explicit statute or court rule, in situations where a lawyer has
reason to know that conduct "impedes or subverts the process of
resolving disputes" and "the fair balance of interests.., essential
to litigation., 25 ' The standard has been upheld against void-for-
vagueness challenges because lawyers, as professionals, can be
charged with knowledge of what is expected of them based on
the guidance provided in case law and the legal profession's
252traditions.
These criteria provide grounds for finding witness
noncooperation requests, including those made in settlement
negotiations, impermissible. The idea that partisan interference
with an adversary's access to an otherwise willing witness
interferes with the proper administration of justice has a long
history in both the ABA's ethical pronouncements and case law,
as shown in Part III of this Article. Disciplinary decisions have
frequently relied on the "conduct prejudicial" rule to sanction
253
attorneys who made noncooperation requests , and many of
249 See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
250 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c
(2000); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-12.
251 In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 628 (Alaska 2001) (characterizing what cases
imposing discipline under the rule generally have required); see also In re Hopkins,
677 A.2d 55, 59-61 (D.C. 1996). See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 69, at
39-44, 63-64 (discussing the obligation of attorneys, long recognized by courts and
acknowledged in the "conduct prejudicial" provisions of ethical codes, to avoid
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process).
252 See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Discipline
of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1079-81 (Mass. 2004); Comm. on Legal Ethics v.
Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325, 328 (W. Va. 1988).
253 See supra notes 143, 177 and accompanying text.
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those decisions involved attempts to secure a noncooperation
pledge as part of a plea deal or civil settlement.254  The cases
holding noncooperation clauses unenforceable are also based on
the idea that buying witness silence through a settlement
agreement undermines the proper functioning of the justice
255
system. Where courts have declared a particular type of
agreement contrary to public policy precisely because it is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, it is fair to charge
lawyers who seek such a provision with engaging in prejudicial
256conduct. The principles articulated in court decisions and the
profession's own ethical statements provide sufficient guidance
for lawyers to know that conditioning a settlement on an
254 See People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982) (discipline imposed for
offering civil settlement with suggestion that payment be used to travel to avoid
being subpoenaed for criminal trial); Fla. Bar v. Machin, 635 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1994)
(upholding discipline of defense attorney who offered to set up a trust fund for
victim in exchange for victim's family not speaking at sentencing hearing); In re
Lutz, 607 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1980) (discipline imposed for offering civil settlement
conditioned on agreement not to testify in criminal case); In re Boothe, 740 P.2d
785, 788-89, 790-91 (Or. 1987) (attorney disciplined for conditioning civil
settlement on agreement not to testify at disciplinary hearing); In re Bonet, 29 P.3d
1242 (Wash. 2001) (disciplining prosecutor for offering to drop charges against
defendant if he agreed to assert privilege to avoid testifying for another defendant);
Morano v. Williams, Grievance Decision No. 98-0663 (Conn. Statewide Grievance
Comm. 2002) (finding violation where attorney offered settlement payment to
victim in exchange for his agreement not to testify or cooperate with police or
prosecutors); cf State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 481-82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that because it is improper for a prosecutor to request a witness not to
speak with defense counsel outside of prosecutor's presence, a fortiori it is improper
to impose this condition, as part of a plea bargain, on a defendant who is a potential
witness in another case).
255 See supra text accompanying notes 185-203.
256 The legislative history of the Model Rules suggests that putting unenforceable
terms in a settlement agreement is not per se unethical. A Kutak Commission
proposal to prohibit lawyers from counseling or assisting a client in the preparation
of a written instrument containing terms that the lawyer knows are legally
prohibited was eliminated in the ABA House of Delegates. See LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 150, at 44. The sponsor of the successful amendment argued
that it is legitimate for lawyers to help clients "express an understanding, which they
may recognize as being legally unenforceable, or which they may believe will
become enforceable over time." Id. at 45. However, where courts have found a
particular type of agreement to be unenforceable because it is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, lawyers who seek such a provision are engaging in conduct
that they should know undermines the justice system's proper functioning.
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opposing party's agreement not to cooperate as a witness in
2 57
other cases is harmful to the administration of justice.
2. Selling Noncooperation
Rule 3.4(f) prohibits lawyers from asking for noncooperation,
but says nothing about the responsibilities of the lawyer who
receives an improper request. South Carolina's ethics
committee appropriately concluded that it would be unethical
for a plaintiff's lawyer to recommend that his client accept a
settlement with a noncooperation clause: "Rule 8.4(a) prohibits
a lawyer from knowingly assisting another to violate any Rule.
By recommending to his client an improper request of defense
counsel, plaintiff's counsel would be assisting the defense
counsel in violating Rule 3.4(f). .... ,,258 Because noncooperation
settlements are prejudicial to the administration of justice, an
attorney who counsels a client to enter into one violates Model
Rule 8.4(d) as well. 259
257 Cf 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 65.6, at 65-23 n.5 (observing that
purchasing a witness's silence "would obviously . . . be 'prejudicial to the
administration of justice,"' in addition to violating Model Rule 3.4).
258 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993). This analysis should not
be affected by an official comment that the ABA added to Model Rule 8.4(a) in
2002, which states that the rule "does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client
concerning action the client is legally entitled to take." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 1 (2008). Recommending that the client accept an unethical
proposal, or agreeing to negotiate such terms on the client's behalf, is qualitatively
different from informing the client that it is not illegal for the client to enter such an
agreement without the attorney's assistance. As I will discuss later, it is neither
futile nor inappropriate for ethics rules to prohibit attorney facilitation of
agreements that are harmful to the administration of justice even though clients
might not be legally barred from entering such agreements on their own. See infra
text accompanying notes 329-39.
259 The fact that Rule 3.4(f) by its terms applies only to the lawyer requesting
noncooperation cannot support an inference that the Model Rules' drafters
intended to permit attorneys to effectuate unethical requests made by opposing
counsel. One might argue that when the rule-drafters wanted to ban lawyers from
accepting as well as offering something, they knew how to say so. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2008) (prohibiting lawyer participation in
"offering or making" a settlement agreement that restricts the lawyer's right to
practice). But Rule 3.4(f)'s focus on the requesting attorney's role is explained by
its context. It is part of a rule that prohibits a variety of unfair litigation tactics that
lawyers may be tempted to use to advance their clients' interests. Asking
witnesses-who frequently are unrepresented-not to cooperate is one such form of
strategic behavior. The rule's silence about what an attorney should do when faced
with such a request cannot reasonably be construed as reflecting a judgment that it
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What if the plaintiff's attorney urges the client to refuse the
request, but the client still wants to go forward? If the plaintiff's
lawyer participates in the drafting or execution of the agreement,
she is helping to bring about the very results that the defendant's
lawyer is prohibited from seeking. The rules relating to witness
noncooperation exist to prevent harms to other litigants and the
justice system; they are not something that a lawyer should be
able to waive at the client's request. The plaintiff's lawyer needs
to explain to her client that a lawyer cannot ethically negotiate
an agreement that requires witness noncooperation. If the client
insists, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation.
Model Rule 1.16 requires an attorney to withdraw if following
the client's instructions would result in an ethical violation.
26 °
Can a plaintiff's lawyer affirmatively offer noncooperation as
a sweetener to increase the value of a settlement? This would
not violate Rule 3.4(f), because the lawyer is not requesting that
anyone besides the lawyer's own client refrain from
disclosures. 6 ' However, even more than the passive acceptance
considered above, this active instigation should be considered a
violation of Rule 8.4(a), which makes it unethical to "knowingly
assist or induce another" to violate a rule, or to violate a rule
"through the acts of another."262  Inviting the defendant to
tender money in exchange for a noncooperation pledge is doing
is ethical for an attorney to help bring about results that the requesting attorney
cannot ethically seek.
260 See id. R. 1.16(a)(1) & cmt. 2; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1981). Withdrawal is subject to the approval of
the tribunal if the case is in litigation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.16(c) (2008); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(1) (1981).
If permission to withdraw were denied, the plaintiff's lawyer should still refuse to
negotiate or sign off on the unethical settlement terms. Denial of permission to
withdraw might absolve the lawyer from responsibility for an ethical violation that
would result from the mere fact of continued representation (e.g., a conflict of
interest), but it could not justify carrying out a directive of the client that would
require the lawyer to violate an ethics rule. Imagine that a lawyer moved to
withdraw because her client insisted that she present perjured testimony at an
upcoming trial; if the motion were denied, clearly the lawyer would still have an
ethical obligation to refuse to proffer the testimony.
261 See Cohen & Bernard, supra note 11 (pointing out that Rule 3.4(f) "prohibits
asking someone 'other than your client' from refraining to give information, and
thus would not prevent offering the same from your own client").
262 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2008); see also Mo. Sup. Ct.
Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 125 (2008) (stating that it violates Rule 8.4(a) "for an
attorney to propose a settlement that includes a provision that would involve a
violation of any of the Rules of Professional Conduct by another attorney").
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exactly that. It also should be viewed as a violation of Rule
8.4(d), the "conduct prejudicial" rule. Like any witness, the
lawyer's client has the freedom to decide whether or not to
cooperate in other cases. However, it is quite another matter for
a lawyer to participate in the sale of that right. The reasons
given by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for
disciplining an attorney who offered to sell information about
the identity of a witness apply with equal force here:
The attempt to sell evidence is "conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice" .... To permit one attorney
to sell information is to permit another to buy it; thus, were the
profession to countenance the selling of evidence (other than
expert opinion evidence for a fee), it would also endorse an
attorney's decision, indeed obligation, to further a client's
interests by purchasing harmful factual evidence, in order to
assure the seller's silence. . . .Because a market in factual
evidence would hinder the discovery of truth within the justice
system and often taint the outcome of disputes, whether
litigated or not, the [court] unanimously concludes that
attorneys, as officers of the court, may not participate in such a
market either as buyers or as sellers. 263
The ABA's ethics committee has found that in one particular
context it is not impermissible for a lawyer to use a client's
willingness to refrain from being a witness to gain leverage in
264
settlement negotiations. The Model Code included a
provision that prohibited using or threatening criminal
prosecution to gain advantage in a civil matter, based on the
idea that invoking criminal sanctions for private gain subverts
the criminal process, which is "designed for the protection of
society as a whole., 266 In a 1992 formal ethics opinion, the ABA
concluded that the Model Rules' drafters had deliberately
263 1n re Sablowsky, 529 A.2d 289, 293 (D.C. 1987). The case involved a lawyer
who obtained information from a nurse about an operation that was the subject of a
malpractice suit, which cast doubt on the defendant hospital's version of events.
The attorney, who was not involved in the litigation, approached the lawyer for the
plaintiff and offered to provide information about the witness's identity in exchange
for a consulting fee. See id. at 290; cf Williamson v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 582
P.2d 126 (Cal. 1978) (employing similar reasoning in finding it impermissible for a
defendant to buy a codefendant's agreement not to use a witness at trial).
264 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992)
(concerning the use of threats of prosecution in connection with a civil matter).
265 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1981).
266 Id. EC 7-21.
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omitted this rule because they viewed it as overly broad.267 The
ethics committee noted that the crimes of compounding and
extortion, as defined in the Model Penal Code, allow a crime
victim to threaten prosecution in order to obtain restitution for
harm caused by the offense. It found that such threats do not
subvert the criminal justice system if the threatened criminal
liability is well-founded in fact and law and arises from the same
facts or transaction as the civil claim. The committee cautioned,
however, that "exploitation of extraneous matters ...to gain
leverage in settling a civil claim" would tend to prejudice the
268
administration of justice and may violate Model Rule 8.4.
Noncooperation offers of the sort I have been discussing fall
on the unethical side of this line. When a crime victim forgoes
the right to ask law enforcement authorities to punish the
offender, the potential criminal proceeding that is affected arises
directly from a wrong committed against the victim. In contrast,
when a plaintiff agrees not to disclose relevant information to
others with claims against the defendant, the affected
proceedings have a basis independent of the wrong suffered by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff's lawyer is exploiting "extraneous
matters" to gain advantage in a way that has a tangible impact
on other parties' ability to prove their claims.
3. To Whom Must Disclosure Be Allowed?
Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer from asking a nonclient to
"refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another
party., 269 The word "party" has a range of possible meanings in
ordinary and legal usage. In its narrowest sense, it means a
person who is a formal party to a legal proceeding, such as the
plaintiff or defendant in a civil lawsuit. It can also mean a
person who is involved or has an interest in a dispute or
transaction, regardless of whether a formal proceeding has been
267 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363
(1992).
268 Id. Two years later, the committee found that the use of threats to bring a
disciplinary complaint against opposing counsel to gain advantage in a civil
settlement, although not expressly prohibited in the Model Rules, generally would
constitute "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice" under Rule
8.4(d), in part because such a threat introduces "extraneous factors" unrelated to
the merits of the client's claim into the decision whether to settle or proceed to trial.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994).
269 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008) (emphasis added).
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filed. For example, someone whose rights have been adversely
affected by another's actions can be referred to as an "aggrieved
party., 270  In its broadest sense, "party" can simply mean
''person," as in the phrase "third party." The rule's language is
also ambiguous as to when the person's status as a "party"
matters. Does "another party" refer only to someone who is a
party at the moment the noncooperation request is made, or
does it also extend to future parties (i.e., to someone who is a
"party" when the act of "voluntarily giving relevant
information" occurs)?
The interpretive approach taken by the ABA's ethics
committee in a 1995 opinion that addressed similar issues is
instructive. The committee considered how the word "party"
should be construed in Model Rule 4.2, which at the time
prohibited communications "with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer., 271 It looked to the purposes
that the rule is intended to serve, and concluded that the rule's
goals of protecting against interference with lawyer-client
relationships and avoiding the risk of attorney overreaching are
best achieved by reading the word "party" in its broadest sense,
as being equivalent to "person." 27 2 Interpreting "party" to refer
only to those who are formal parties in litigation would make
little sense, the committee found, since Rule 4.2's purposes are
equally applicable to persons who have retained counsel "when
litigation is simply under consideration, even though it has not
actually been instituted. 273
Ambiguities in Rule 3.4(f) should also be resolved in light of
274its purposes. The rule is aimed at preventing harms to theintegrity of adversary litigation that result when lawyers block
270 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 2004) (definitions of "party"
and "aggrieved party"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "party" as "[a] person concerned or having or taking part in any affair,
matter, transaction, or proceeding, considered individually").
271 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1994).
272 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
The committee also proposed that to eliminate ambiguities arising from the use of
the word "party," Rule 4.2 should be amended to substitute the word "person" for
"party." Id. at nn.2 & 16. The ABA House of Delegates later made this change.
See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 150, at 534.
273 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, at n.17
(1995).
274 See supra Part IV.A.
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the flow of relevant information, not only to persons who have
actually sued their clients, but also to those investigating
potential claims. The original articulation of the principle in the
ABA's Formal Opinion 131 made this clear. The ABA found
witness noncooperation requests unethical because such conduct
tends to "prevent the truth from being presented to the court in
the event litigation arises.,275 Among the rationales that courts
have given for a principle of unimpeded witness access are that
the interests of the justice system are furthered when attorneys
are able to ascertain the facts before filing suit, so that
meritorious cases will be filed or settled and meritless ones will
not be brought solely to obtain discovery.276 Accordingly,
"another party" in Rule 3.4(f) should be read to mean a person
with a potential claim against the lawyer's client, regardless of
277
whether suit has actually been filed.
Rule 3.4(f) should be construed to cover future parties as well
as current ones. The rule is aimed at preventing interference
with voluntary disclosures of relevant information to parties with
claims against the lawyer's client. Whether the claim already
exists at the time of the noncooperation request or arises later
should make no difference. The settlements that lawyers for the
Archdiocese of Boston negotiated in the 1990s in at least seventy
cases alleging child molestation by priests, which required the
plaintiffs to remain silent about the underlying facts, illustrate
278the point. The information known by a settling plaintiff would
be highly relevant in any later suit alleging that the same priest
abused another victim, both to establish a pattern of conduct by
the abuser and the archdiocese's awareness of the danger.
Making the ethical propriety of the defense lawyer's
noncooperation request depend on whether the priest had
already abused another child or would do so in the future would
275 ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935)
(emphasis added).
276 See, e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 261-62 (S.D. Iowa
1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 178-84.
277 Note that this represents a rejection of the broadest definition of "party" (as
"person") as well as the narrowest (as formal participant in a legal proceeding).
Rule 3.4(f)'s reference to "relevant information" and its placement in a rule that is
entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel" suggest that "party" is intended
to refer to a person who has some sort of claim against the lawyer's client, rather
than any person at all.
278 See Carroll et al., supra note 26.
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be arbitrary in relation to the purposes that Rule 3.4(f) is
intended to serve. In either situation, it would be foreseeable
that the first victim's testimony would have evidentiary value in
any similar suits against the defendant.
Another question raised by the phrase "another party" is
whether Rule 3.4(f) prohibits requesting a witness to refrain
from testifying at a trial or hearing unless subpoenaed. South
Carolina's ethics committee concluded that such a provision,
"useless as it ... may be," would not violate Rule 3.4(f). 279 This
is a sound interpretation of the rule's language, inasmuch as the
tribunal deciding a dispute cannot plausibly be described as a
"party" to the dispute.2 However, requesting or offering
inducements to a witness to withhold voluntary testimony should
be considered a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Even if it is relatively
easy for an opposing party to subpoena the witness, it still places
an obstacle in the path of the core fact-finding function of a
hearing, and sometimes it may matter a great deal, such as when
a witness is beyond the geographic reach of a subpoena. The
"conduct prejudicial" rule has frequently, and appropriately,
been applied to discipline lawyers for requests or agreements
281
aimed at discouraging witnesses from testifying.
A public agency that is conducting an investigation to
determine whether to file charges or bring an enforcement
action should be considered a "party" covered by Rule 3.4(f).
Agency officials acting in this role are a "party" in the same
sense as private litigants who are investigating a possible
lawsuit-they are seeking to assess whether a potential legal
282
claim is well-founded and should be pursued. In an
employment discrimination case, for example, it would violate
Rule 3.4(f) for a defense lawyer to offer a settlement that would
prohibit the plaintiff from making voluntary disclosures to the
279 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993).
280 But see In re Kornreich, 693 A.2d 877, 878, 883 (N.J. 1997) (holding, without
discussion of the rule's "another party" language, that an attorney violated Rule
3.4(f) in attempting to dissuade a witness from attending court).
281 See supra note 254.
282 Under Title VII and many similar administrative schemes, the agency plays an
adjudicatory role in the sense that it acts on a complaint made by an aggrieved
party, hears both sides, and issues a ruling. The purpose of the proceeding,
however, is not to determine the rights of the parties but to assess whether there is
sufficient cause to bring an enforcement action before a court or administrative law
judge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2008) (enforcement provisions of Title VII).
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EEOC or a comparable state agency investigating other
discrimination complaints against the same defendant.
4. The Employee Exception
Rule 3.4(f) contains an exception clause that allows a
noncooperation request to be made if "the person is a relative or
an employee or other agent of a client" and the lawyer
reasonably believes the person's interests will not be adversely
2813
affected by withholding information. The official comment
explains the employee exception by noting "employees may
identify their interests with those of the client," and cross-
references Rule 4.2, the rule prohibiting lawyer contacts with
represented parties. 284  According to the Restatement, such
requests are permitted because individuals in the specified
relationships may have a "special loyalty to the lawyer's client"
285
and a duty to protect confidential information.
283 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1) & (2) (2008). The rule's
language is clear that both requirements must be satisfied in order for the exception
to apply; i.e., the person in'question must be a relative, employee, or other agent of
the client, and the lawyer must reasonably believe that the person's interests will
not be adversely affected. See In re Alcantara, 676 A.2d 1030, 1034-35 (N.J. 1995);
Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 120 (2008). But see Cohen & Bernard, supra
note 11 (incorrectly describing Rule 3.4(f)(2) as a "catch-all" exception that allows
lawyers to request noncooperation whenever they reasonably believe that the
person's interests will not be adversely affected thereby).
284 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 4 (2008). Because Rule
3.4(f) uses the word "request," it is possible to read the exception as forbidding a
lawyer from requiring, as opposed to requesting, that employees refuse to be
interviewed by someone suing the company. See Wis. State Bar Prof'l Ethics
Comm., Formal Op. E-07-01 (2007); Proposed N.Y. Rules, supra note 247,
Reporter's Note to Rule 3.4 (interpreting Rule 3.4(f) in this manner). It seems
doubtful that the rule was intended to have this effect. The word "request" is used
in reference to the general prohibition rather than the exception ("A lawyer shall
not request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party unless .... "), and the prohibition clearly reaches
demands as well as nonbinding requests. Employers are ordinarily free to request
their employees to do something to serve its interests, or else be fired. See 2
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 8, § 30.12, illus. 30-8 (concluding that a lawyer does
not violate the rule by informing a client's employees that they should not speak to
a lawyer or investigator for a plaintiff suing the company unless he is present and
that they will be fired if they do so).
285 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. e
(2000). The Restatement also explains that the exception for "other agent[s]" is
designed to reach "an investigator or expert witness" retained by the lawyer's client
or the lawyer. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 93-378 (1993).
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The exception has not been, and should not be, read to extend
286to former employees. It is phrased in the present tense ("the
person is... an employee ... of a client" 287), which suggests that
the drafters intended it to be applicable only to current• 288
employees. The assumptions of special loyalty and shared
interests that underlie the employee exception generally hold
true only while the employment relationship lasts. The cross-
reference to Rule 4.2 indicates that Rule 3.4(f)'s exception is
designed to parallel the no-contact rule: in situations where an
opposing lawyer is prohibited from speaking with employees of a
represented entity, it is appropriate for the entity's lawyer to ask
its employees not to speak to opposing counsel. 2" Rule 4.2 has
286 See, e.g., Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 n.3 (D. Mont.
1986). The Restatement takes the position that noncooperation requests are
permissible with respect to former employees "only if the person continues to
maintain a confidential relationship with the former employer, such as an employee
continuing to consult with respect to the matter involved in the representation"-in
other words, with someone who remains a current agent of the employer-or if the
individual "possesses extensive confidential information of the former employer."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt. e (2000).
That last qualification runs parallel to the Restatement requirement that lawyers not
communicate with persons who are known to have had extensive exposure to
privileged or otherwise legally protected information through their employment
and "who likely possess[] little information that is not privileged." Id. § 102 cmt. d.
This applies only in "situations in which confidentiality occurs by operation of law
and not solely, for example, through a contractual undertaking of the agent." Id.
287 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1) (2008). Virginia is the only
state that has modified the exception to allow noncooperation requests to be made
to "a current or former employee" where "the information is relevant in a pending
civil matter." VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(h) (2004) (emphasis added).
288 Cf Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that
Congress's use of the present indicative verb form in defining a statutory term
means that a person must be presently in that condition to qualify); Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1997) (finding that the terms "employees" and
"employed" in Title VII could be read to include former employees because of the
absence of any temporal qualifier such as would exist if the statute said "is
employed").
289 The exception in Rule 3.4(f) is broader than Rule 4.2 insofar as it authorizes
asking all current employees to withhold cooperation from an adversary, while Rule
4.2 permits the opposing lawyer to seek interviews with some categories of current
employees. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 100 cmt. f (2000).
Three states have narrowed the exception to bring it into closer alignment with the
no-contact rule. North Carolina's version of Rule 3.4(f) limits the exception to
managerial employees. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(1) (2006). In
Pennsylvania, noncooperation requests are allowed under the employee exception
only when "such conduct is not prohibited by Rule 4.2." PA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4(d)(2) (2006). The Supreme Court of Washington has held that
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been interpreted to allow ex parte interviews with former
employees so as not to unduly restrict adversaries' access to the
facts.290  Rule 3.4(f)'s core principle of noninterference with
witness access would be severely undermined if its exception
were read to allow employers' lawyers to effectively foreclose
such interviews by engineering agreements that require former
291
employees to withhold cooperation.
The exception should be understood to carry with it the
requirement that any noncooperation obligation placed on an
employee not extend beyond the period of that person's
employment. For example, consider the case of a plaintiff who
files a sexual harassment complaint without quitting her job. As
long as she remains an employee, the company's lawyer can ask
for a noncooperation clause as part of a settlement without
violating Rule 3.4(f). But if the agreement would continue to
bar her from voluntarily disclosing relevant information to other
litigants after she leaves the job, the lawyer's request should be
considered unethical. The rule's. language is ambiguous as to
whether the condition that "the person is ... an employee" must
be satisfied only at the time the noncooperation request is made,
or whether it also must hold true at the time of "voluntarily
giving relevant information to another party.'''292 The latter
reading best serves the rule's purposes. Otherwise, the
exception's limitation to current employees could be rendered a
nullity by requiring every employee, while still employed, to sign
noncooperation requests may be made only to those employees who would be
considered represented parties under the no-contact rule, reasoning that "[a]n
attorney's right to interview corporate employees would be a hollow one if
corporations were permitted to instruct their employees not to meet with adverse
counsel." Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984); see also
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 5 (2006) (explaining that
Washington did not adopt Model Rule 3.4(f) because it is inconsistent with Wright).
290 See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (finding that neither the text
nor the commentary to Rule 4.2 suggest that coverage of former employees was
intended and that "expand[ing] its coverage to former employees by means of
liberal interpretation" is inappropriate where the effect would be "to inhibit the
acquisition of information").
291 Cf Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) ("In construing provisions ... in
which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the
exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.").
292 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2008).
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an agreement pledging to never cooperate with anyone suing the
company.
5. Placing Restrictions on the Type of Information That May Be
Disclosed or the Manner of Disclosure
Is it ethically permissible to require in a settlement agreement
that the plaintiff not disclose (even to other litigants) certain
types of information, such as the terms of the settlement
agreement, information learned through discovery, privileged
information, or trade secrets? Can a defendant require that the
plaintiff not initiate contacts with other litigants, insist on a right
to be present at any interviews, or impose other restrictions to
minimize the risk of overly broad disclosure?
Answers to these questions should be informed by the rule's
raison d'etre, which is to give litigants a fair opportunity to
gather information that "may be useful ... in establishing the
true facts and circumstances affecting the dispute., 293 Although
part of the rule's purpose is to enable litigants to develop their
cases without the expense and constraints of formal discovery, it
is founded on the same conception of party responsibility for
finding and developing the facts that informs the scope of
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
phrase "relevant information" in Rule 3.4(f) should be read as
broadly as the discovery rules' definition of relevance-anything
relating to a party's claim or defense that "appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.,
294
a. Secrecy of the Amount or Terms of a Settlement
This standard suggests that it should be permissible to
prohibit disclosure of a settlement agreement's monetary terms.
Settlement amounts are nearly always inadmissible in
subsequent proceedings and have generally been held to be
beyond the scope of discovery. 5 The settlement terms are a
construction of the settling parties, rather than historical facts
293 ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935).
294 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
295 See FED. R. EVID. 408; Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). Prior settlement payments may be discoverable in unusual circumstances
where a compelling need can be-shown. See Dord, supra note 9, at 815 n.139 (giving
examples).
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296having evidentiary significance. While the information may be
very useful to future litigants bringing similar cases, because it
sends signals about the defendant's assessment of the strength of
the claim against it and how much it is willing to pay to avoid
trial, the defendant has a legitimate interest in keeping these
matters confidential. Part of what Rule 3.4(f) is designed to
protect-the availability of ex parte witness interviews so that
parties can learn facts without revealing their litigation
strategies-rests on the idea that the adversary system works
best when work product of this sort is shielded from
297disclosure. A large settlement may be based on factors
unrelated to the merits, such as the defendant's risk averseness,
concerns about a biased tribunal, or fear of adverse publicity.
Disclosure could have the effect of encouraging frivolous
298lawsuits.
296 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST
PRACTICES ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC
ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES 45 (2007) (recommending that courts assessing whether to
approve or enforce a confidential settlement "should distinguish between
,settlement facts,' such as the amount, terms and conditions of a compromise, and
'adjudicative facts' that are relevant to the merits of the underlying controversy");
Dor6, supra note 27, at 398-99 (arguing that agreements to keep settlement terms
confidential should be enforced by courts because, "ruinlike the historical facts
giving rise to the settlement, settlement facts lay peculiarly within party control and
would not exist but for the litigation in which they were generated"); see also Dor6,
supra note 9, at 814. The cases holding noncooperation agreements unenforceable
in other proceedings have generally limited this principle to factual information
surrounding the settled case, but not the amount a case settled for. See, e.g.,
Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993).
297 See supra text accompanying notes 112-31,158, 181-84.
298 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2685
(1995) (arguing against generally making settlements public because good
settlement "requires the revelation of . . . 'nonlegally relevant facts,' such as the
parties' real and underlying needs and interests . . . including such factors as
emotional needs and motives, future business needs, financial data,- . . . [and]
psychological and social issues like risk aversion," and because disclosure of
settlement terms will chill the willingness of parties to reach agreement based on
such factors); Weinstein, supra note 16, at 517 ("Sometimes a defendant will give a
premium to a particularly effective advocate or appealing case because going to trial
might result in an unusually high verdict, ratcheting up settlements across the board.
At other times the defendant will agree to a settlement in a completely meritless
case because the jurisdiction is notoriously pro-plaintiff .... "); Alison Lothes,
Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and
Litigants' Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 460-63 (2005) (arguing that
disclosure of settlement amounts may reveal more about a defendant's strategies
than its culpability and create incentives for frivolous suits).
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Nonmonetary provisions that are designed to prevent the
recurrence of wrongful conduct are another matter. The
settlement of a sexual harassment claim, for example, might
contain a requirement that the employer institute sexual
harassment training, and a Clean Water Act settlement might set
forth steps that a factory will take to avoid future chemical spills.
In subsequent cases alleging similar misconduct, settlement
terms of this sort may constitute or lead to admissible evidence
relevant to liability or damages on issues such as the defendant's
awareness of the nature or extent of a problem and whether it
exercised reasonable care to prevent recurrence. 299 Under Rule
3.4(f), disclosure of such settlement terms to other litigants must
be allowed.
b. Information Learned Through Discovery
An argument might be made for limiting the scope of
disclosure under Rule 3.4(f) to knowledge that a person acquired
independently of the lawsuit but not information learned by
means of discovery. In holding that protective orders which
A case for making settlement data available to other litigants can be made on
grounds of economic efficiency. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 570 (6th ed. 2003) (suggesting that confidential settlement agreements
impose costs on other litigants and impair the efficiency of the court system because
if plaintiffs "knew the terms of... earlier settlements they would be able to make a
more accurate estimate of the value of their own claims"); Scott A. Moss,
Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105
MICH. L. REV. 867, 886-903 (2007) (arguing that a rule prohibiting confidential
settlements once suit has been filed would lead to more accurate settlement
valuation, more early settlements, and less frivolous litigation). Greater public
availability of settlement information may also send valuable signals about the
extent and seriousness of problems such as workplace discrimination and defective
products, assist in the evaluation of how effectively laws are functioning, and help
people make better informed decisions about where to work or what to buy. See
Moss, supra, at 903-10; see also Kotkin, supra note 52, at 961-71. These are good
reasons to consider enacting statutes or rules to forbid settlement on secret terms,
but they have little bearing on how Rule 3.4(f), which exists to safeguard litigant
access to relevant evidence, should be interpreted.
299 A New Jersey trial court followed this line of reasoning in holding that a
confidentiality agreement that barred disclosure of the terms of a sexual harassment
settlement was unenforceable when the information was sought by a plaintiff who
later brought a similar harassment claim against the same defendant. The court
found the settlement terms relevant to ascertaining what the company knew, when
they knew it, and how they responded when the existence of a hostile work
environment was brought to their attention. See Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845
A.2d 732, 736, 739 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). It is not clear, however, why the
court concluded that the monetary amount of the settlement was relevant.
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prohibit the further dissemination of discovery materials do not
violate litigants' First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has
reasoned that a party's access to those materials exists only by
virtue of the court's discovery processes, and limitations on the
use of the information can be imposed as a quid pro quo for
broad access. 300 A settlement agreement that requires the return
of all discovery materials or prohibits their disclosure to anyone
(including other litigants) arguably rests on the same bargain;
the information does not "belong" to the plaintiff but was made
available with the implicit understanding that it be used only for
301purposes of trying the plaintiff's case.
Rule 3.4(f), however, is not about the plaintiff's ownership of
information or interest in disseminating it. Its purpose is to
forbid adversarial interference with other parties' access to
relevant information. The fact that a court has the authority to
issue a protective order prohibiting the further dissemination of
discovery materials does not entitle a defendant to such
protection; the rules of procedure require that protective orders
302be issued only upon a showing of good cause. If there are
legitimate reasons for restricting the use of certain discovery
materials, because they contain trade secrets or implicate
personal privacy interests, for example, a party can apply for a303
protective order. In the absence of a court-approved
protective order, neither the text nor the objectives of Rule
3.4(f) provides a basis for exempting information learned in
discovery from the rule's requirement that a party's lawyer not
300 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984). The Court has
given more stringent First Amendment protection to the dissemination of
information obtained independently of judicial processes. See Butterworth v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1990) (holding that a state statute that was used to
prohibit a grand jury witness from ever disclosing the facts about which he
testified-information that he already possessed and did not learn about as a result
of his participation in the grand jury process-was unconstitutional).
301 Cf Bdchamps, supra note 47, at 151 (arguing, by analogy to the First
Amendment cases, that stipulated gag orders should be limited to information
obtained through the discovery process, and "should not restrict dissemination of
information which the parties acquired prior to the litigation or from independent
sources").
302 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
303 Protective orders generally should allow for disclosure to other litigants who
have a legitimate need for the information. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text. Procedural safeguards, such as requiring that such litigants only use the
information for purposes of the litigation, may be appropriate.
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interfere with an adversary's ability to seek relevant information
from a person who has it.3°4
c. Privileged Information, Trade Secrets, and "Irrelevant"
Information
Prohibiting the disclosure of privileged information that is
subject to a preexisting legal duty of confidentiality should be
permissible under Rule 3.4(f). For example, if the plaintiff in a
wrongful discharge suit is a former manager who communicated
with corporate counsel, the defendant's lawyer can legitimately
ask for a settlement provision that categorically bars the plaintiff
from disclosing information subject to the attorney-client
privilege. Rule 3.4(f) makes no express exception for privileged
information, but the nondisclosure obligation would exist even
in the absence of the lawyer's request, and it would serve no
purpose to read the rule to prevent a lawyer from taking steps to
ensure compliance. 3 5  There is no interference with the
legitimate informational interests of other litigants: privileged
information is beyond the scope of discovery, 3°6 and a lawyer
304 In the absence of an order or agreement to the contrary, parties are free to
disclose discovery materials to whomever they wish. See THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, supra note 296, at 7 (citing case authority). Since there is no
preexisting obligation to keep the information confidential, Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a
lawyer from requesting a nonclient to refrain from disclosing such materials to other
parties with claims against the lawyer's client when the information is relevant to
those claims. This does not mean that contractual agreements to keep discovery
materials confidential are per se prohibited under Rule 3.4(f); they simply need to
include an exception that allows for the limited class of disclosures that the rule
protects. If a party believes that no such exception is appropriate, the claim should
be decided by the court. Offering inducements to obtain the other side's agreement
not to oppose such a motion should be considered a violation of Rule 3.4(f); it is
tantamount to asking a witness to voluntarily refrain from making disclosures
covered by the rule. Cf Koniak, supra note 13, at 805 (arguing that payoffs to get
an opposing party to agree to a protective order should be sanctionable).
305 The Restatement takes this position in its commentary on the rule against
noncooperation requests. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 116 cmt. e (2000). Two states have modified Model Rule 3.4(f) to
provide an explicit exception for information that is subject to a legal duty of
confidentiality. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d)(2) (2008) (creating
exception where "the person may be required by law to refrain from disclosing the
information"); GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(2) (2008) (creating an
exception for information "subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client").
306 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense .... ").
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conducting informal interviews is prohibited under the ethics
• - , • 307
rules from seeking privileged information.
A harder issue is presented by confidentiality obligations that
are recognized in law, but generally yield in judicial proceedings
to the interest of other litigants in obtaining relevant evidence
through discovery. Employees have a common law and/or
statutory duty not to disclose trade secrets or other proprietary
commercial information of their employer, which continues after
308the employment relationship ends. Unlike privileged
information, trade secrets are discoverable, but a party may
apply for a protective order, and if good cause is shown a court
can order that the information "not be revealed or be revealed
only in a specified way., 30 9  The usual judicial response is to
grant a protective order that allows the discovery if the
information is relevant, but limits its use to the litigation and
contains safeguards to ensure the information is not publicly
310disclosed.
An agreement that prohibits the voluntary disclosure of trade
secret information relevant to other parties' claims runs counter
to the purposes of Rule 3.4(f) to the extent that it impairs the
ability of other litigants to gather discoverable evidence through
ex parte interviews. On the other hand, such an agreement
reflects a preexisting legal obligation not to disclose in the
absence of legal compulsion, and ensures that the defendant has
the opportunity to obtain the safeguards of a protective order.
On balance, it probably should be allowed. This interpretation is
consistent with the case law on enforceability; courts have found
307 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a), R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (2008)
(prohibiting lawyers from using methods of obtaining evidence that violate a
person's rights, including intrusions into privileged relationships); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (stating that an attorney
interviewing a former employee of an adversary party "must be careful not to seek
to induce the former employee to violate the privilege attaching to attorney-client
communications" so as not to violate Rule 4.4).
308 See Becker, supra note 179, at 967-76 (discussing the scope and sources of
legal protection of trade secrets and proprietary information held by former
employees). Trade secrets and proprietary information are distinct concepts, but
for ease of discussion I will use "trade secrets" to refer to both.
309 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
310 Similar protection is often given to information that implicates personal
privacy interests, such as sensitive medical or financial information. See id. R.
26(c)(1) (authorizing the issuance of protective orders "to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense").
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noncooperation agreements void as contrary to public policy
only when such agreements go beyond protecting trade secrets
and privileged information. 31' However, it is important to note
that information concerning an employer's illegal or tortious
conduct generally cannot qualify as a trade secret32 Seeking to
block the disclosure of information about wrongful conduct that
is relevant to the claims of other litigants or investigating
agencies, under the guise of trade secret protection, would
violate Rule 3.4(f).
A defense lawyer whose goal is to draft a settlement
agreement that prohibits all disclosures relating to the
underlying facts, except for what must be allowed under Rule
3.4(f), might object to leaving it entirely up to the plaintiff's
judgment to determine what constitutes "relevant information to
311 See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135-37 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (holding agreements that precluded former employees from being
interviewed about company's allegedly illegal activities void as contrary to public
policy, but stating that agreements to keep privileged information, trade secrets, or
highly personal medical information confidential are legitimate); Hoffman v.
Sbarro, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4484 (SS), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 26, 1997) (invalidating agreement that prevented employees from being
interviewed about allegedly illegal payroll practices, while suggesting that the result
might be different if "competition-related information ... such as pricing strategies,
customer lists, or secret recipes" were involved); Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC,
159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding confidentiality agreement invalid
insofar as it prohibited disclosures relevant to age discrimination claim but
legitimate with respect to "genuine trade secrets or other legitimately privileged
information"); cf. Saini v. Int'l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916-17, 920-23 (D.
Nev. 2006) (holding confidentiality agreement that was limited to trade secrets and
confidential product information was enforceable against ex-employee who
voluntarily disclosed such information to a plaintiff suing his ex-employer).
312 See JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-36 (holding that
"whistleblower-type information about allegedly unlawful acts" do not constitute
trade secrets and that a confidentiality agreement cannot be enforced to prevent
another litigant from seeking relevant information about such misconduct through
ex parte interviews); Davidson Supply Co. v. P.P.E., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D.
Md. 1997) (holding that trade secret protection cannot be claimed for information
relating to a defendant's illegal acts); McGrane v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 822 F.
Supp. 1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that "[d]isclosures of wrongdoing do not
constitute revelations of trade secrets which can be prohibited by agreements
binding on former employees"); Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are
Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627 (1999)
(arguing, based on contract, trade secret, and agency principles, that agreements
protecting trade secrets and confidential business information are not enforceable
to prevent disclosures of illegal or tortious conduct or dangers to health and safety);
Garfield, supra note 35, at 327-28 (concluding that "a court is unlikely to protect
information about an employer's tortious conduct as a trade secret" under
principles established in case law and the Restatement of Unfair Competition).
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another party" and isn't privileged or a trade secret. These risks,
however, are unavoidable by-products of the policy balance
struck in the rule: the harms to the truth-seeking function of the
adversary system that arise when lawyers interfere with a
witness's freedom to convey relevant evidence to opposing
parties in ex parte interviews have been deemed to outweigh the
benefits of restricting contacts to the judicially supervised setting
of the formal discovery process.
A settlement agreement that allows for the disclosures that
Rule 3.4(f) contemplates can nonetheless provide significant
guidance as to the scope of permissible disclosure and incentives
to avoid going beyond it. Clear language describing the types of
information that are privileged or subject to trade secret
protection, and imposing penalties for violations, will give a
plaintiff ample incentive to be cautious about crossing the line
into impermissible disclosures. And while the term "relevant
information" is inherently fuzzy, a plaintiff who gratuitously
discloses disparaging information that bears no reasonable
relationship to another party's claim will run the risk of being
found in breach of the agreement.
d. Monitoring Interviews and "Don't Tell Unless Asked"
Provisions
One settlement condition that should not be allowed is a
requirement that the defendant have the opportunity to attend
and monitor any interviews. While this could help to deter
improper disclosures, it runs counter to Rule 3.4(f)'s policy of
preserving access to ex parte interviews, not only because they
are less costly than formal discovery (in this regard, the
adversary's presence at an informal interview would not create
any additional expense), but also because the adversary's
presence may chill a witness's willingness to disclose relevant
facts. Opposing counsel's presence also hinders the interviewing
lawyer's ability to "explore the witness'[s] knowledge, memory
and opinion . . . in light of information counsel may have
developed from other sources" without disclosing the work
• 313
product that informs the lawyer's questions. Under Rule
313 IBM Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-14 (1947) (explaining why materials memorializing ex
parte witness interviews are work product ordinarily shielded from discovery). In
one of the cases holding that a noncooperation agreement could not be used to
20081
OREGON LAW REVIEW
3.4(f) and the identical principle that has developed in the
criminal case law, courts have found it improper for a lawyer to
request a witness not to submit to an interview unless the lawyer
is present.314
Can a defendant's lawyer demand that the plaintiff agree not
to initiate contact with other parties and disclose information
only if approached? A few of the enforceability cases suggest
this might be an acceptable way of ensuring that the plaintiff
does not cross the line from providing relevant information to
actively fomenting litigation.1 5 Such a restriction, however, is
hard to square with the text and goals of Rule 3.4(f).
To be sure, some restrictions on how information is
disseminated should be permitted. Running advertisements or
sending out a press release could help to ensure that people with
potential claims learn of relevant evidence, but also would
broadcast information harmful to the defendant's reputation to
prevent witness interviews, the judge's order provided that the defendant would be
permitted to have a representative present as an observer, unless the defendant had
previously interviewed the witness. See Chambers, 159 F.R.D. at 445-46. This
procedure would likely lead to guarded responses that would substantially
undermine the value of informal interviews, and it runs counter to the logic of
Hickman and Edelstein, which found that confidential witness interviews play an
essential role in the search for truth. See supra text accompanying notes 112-23.
Other decisions have rejected the Chambers court's requirement that the defendant
be given the opportunity to attend. See JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F.
Supp. 2d at 1138; Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18908, at *4-*7.
314 See, e.g., Davis v. Dow Corning Corp., 530 N.W.2d 178, 179-81 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs' lawyer's letter to plaintiffs' treating physicians
requesting that they not speak to defense attorneys unless plaintiffs' counsel was
present violated Rule 3.4(f)); State v. Hofstetter, 878 P.2d 474, 480-82 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (listing and discussing decisions finding requests that witnesses not
speak to defense counsel except in the prosecutor's presence to be improper); S.C.
Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-14 (1999) (finding that prosecutor's request
that public safety officers not discuss cases with criminal defense attorneys outside
his presence would violate Rule 3.4(f)). But see BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note
146, at 245 n.2 (expressing the view that requesting a witness "to notify one
whenever he or she is contacted by the opposition so that one can arrange to be
present at any interview" would be ethically permissible).
315 See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22 (relying in part on the fact that a former
employee initiated disclosures to another litigant, rather than waiting to be
contacted, as reason for holding the agreement enforceable); Chambers, 159 F.R.D.
at 444 (limiting holding that noncooperation agreements are unenforceable to
situations "where the former employee is not the initiating party" and expressly
declining to reach the issue of whether "restrictions on recruiting others to complain
or sue" are permissible).
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• 316the public at large. However, a "don't tell unless asked"
requirement goes too far in the other direction. A person who
has settled with a defendant may have information highly
probative of another party's claim. The other claimant may be
unaware of the witness's knowledge and thus have no reason to
contact the witness; without the information, the person may
even be unaware that he or she has the basis for a claim. It is not
uncommon for a witness, upon hearing about a case or harmful
conduct by a defendant, to contact the injured party or an
investigating agency to volunteer relevant information: Rule
3.4(f), which prohibits interference with "voluntarily giving
relevant information to another party," contains no language
limiting this to situations where the witness has first been
contacted, and the rule's core purpose, preventing adversary
interference with a party's access to information that can assist in
ascertaining the truth, militates against an interpretation that
would categorically exclude witness-initiated disclosures.
318
A settlement clause along the following lines would strike the
appropriate balance:
The plaintiff shall not encourage or solicit litigation against the
defendant, but may voluntarily disclose relevant information to
a person or agency that has filed, is investigating, or is known
to have the basis for a claim against the defendant.
316 Cf. Marcus, supra note 32, at 499-500 (discussing the problem of how
information maybe disseminated under protective orders that provide for discovery
sharing).
317 See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 2007)
(describing how a person alleging that Wal-Mart failed to hire him because of
mobility impairments contacted the EEOC to offer his services as a possible witness
after hearing about a disability discrimination claim that had been filed against Wal-
Mart); Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs.,.59 P.3d 1237, 1239 (Nev. 2002) (describing
how an employee of the defendant company contacted the attorney for a plaintiff
who had brought a sex discrimination claim, offering information showing that the
reasons given by the company for refusing to hire the plaintiff were pretextual).
318 Alan Garfield, in his article analyzing promises of silence under contract law,
argues that contracts that suppress information about tortious conduct should be
unenforceable because they frustrate public policy "by creating barriers for tort
victims attempting to identify wrongdoers and thereby vindicate their rights."
Garfield, supra note 35, at 325. He gives the example of a person who witnesses
one neighbor break another neighbor's window. "If the negligent neighbor pays the
witness for promising not to tell the injured neighbor," a court ought not to enforce
the contract. Id. Rule 3.4(f) protects similar interests and should likewise be
construed to prohibit the negligent neighbor's lawyer from inducing the witness to
refrain from disclosing to the injured party information that supports a claim for
redress.
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This would preclude wide-scale publication as a means of
reaching potential litigants, but allow targeted disclosures when
the plaintiff has reason to know that the recipient has a claim to
which the information is relevant.
CONCLUSION
This Article has made the case that certain settlement terms
lawyers frequently demand or accede to are impermissible under
the ethics rules. This includes not only agreements that
explicitly require noncooperation, but also settlements that
mandate secrecy concerning the facts and make no exception for
voluntary disclosures of information relevant to other parties'
claims. In this concluding section, I will address several general
objections that my analysis invites.
One might argue that the very prevalence of such agreements
shows that they are consistent with professional ethics norms. If
most attorneys have concluded that the ethics rules leave it in
the client's hands to decide whether to offer or accept settlement
terms that preclude voluntary cooperation, and there is no rule
that explicitly and unequivocally says otherwise (Model Rule
3.4(f), after all, says nothing directly about settlements),
shouldn't we defer to lawyers' widely shared understanding of
the rules governing their behavior? The best short answer to
this line of reasoning was given by the first great American legal
ethicist, David Hoffman, in 1836:
What is wrong, is not the less so from being common.... If,
therefore, there be among my brethren, any traditional moral
errors of practice, they shall be studiously avoided by me,
though in so doing, I unhappily come in collision with what is
(erroneously I think) too often denominated the policy of the
profession.319
Lawyers face substantial economic and cultural pressures to view
their obligations through the lens of a partisan, client-centered
approach that subordinates systemic and societal values to
zealous advocacy and produces immediate financial benefits for
their clients and themselves.32 ° When interpreting ethics rules
319 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 765 (Baltimore, Joseph
Neal, 2d ed. 1836).
320 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client
Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1324-26 (1995) (discussing factors that
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that place limitations on client advocacy, there is good reason to
distrust the profession's prevailing wisdom.
Moreover, the fact that settlements requiring noncooperation
are common probably has less to do with lawyers making a
considered judgment that they are ethical than with a simpte lack
of awareness of Rule 3.4(f) and its application to settlement.321
As previously discussed, many plaintiffs' lawyers are
uncomfortable with blanket secrecy requirements but have felt
obliged to go along based on their belief that the ethics rules tie
322their hands. Professional conduct rules, as Murray Schwartz
has pointed out, can fulfill an important "reinforcement
function" by
enabl[ing] lawyers who do not want to assist clients in
questionable transactions to decline on the grounds that the
[rules do] not permit them to go forward, and thus to avoid the
unpleasantness of refusing to assist on a basis that is seen by• . 323
the client as a personal condemnation.
As more plaintiffs' lawyers become aware that the rules provide
a strong argument against noncooperation provisions, more of
them can be expected to tell opposing counsel, and explain to
their clients, that they simply cannot agree to terms that would
324
violate their professional obligations.
A defense lawyer who refuses to back down in the face of an
objection could face a disciplinary complaint. Even if the
plaintiff and her counsel are not inclined to take this step, other
litigants who later learn that a potential witness cannot be
interviewed because of a noncooperation settlement might
grieve the lawyers who negotiated the agreement. Although
disciplinary boards are often reluctant to impose sanctions for
have caused civil litigators to gravitate toward a client-centered approach that
emphasizes purely partisan conduct and ignores provisions of ethics codes that
protect other values); Matasar, supra note 207, at 979-80 (discussing the strong
pressure lawyers face to engage in client-serving conduct that goes beyond what the
rules permit but is deemed acceptable by large numbers of practitioners).
321 See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
323 Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REv. 669, 682 (1978).
324 Explaining why proposed settlement terms violate an ethical rule may be
enough to convince opposing counsel to withdraw them. See Bauer, supra note 9
(containing sample letter informing defense counsel that settlement demand for
noncooperation is unacceptable because it violates Rule 3.4(f)).
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conduct deemed acceptable by a large segment of the bar, courts
and disciplinary authorities have imposed discipline for conduct
that is closely analogous to settlement noncooperation demands,
so the possibility of enforcement cannot be discounted. 325  If
disciplinary decisions begin to be issued, lawyers' incentives to
abide by the rules will be strengthened.326 Plaintiffs' lawyers who
object to defense demands for noncooperation can also seek
advisory opinions from ethics committees; one such ruling has
327
already been issued. Although nonbinding, ethics opinions
may help to develop a consensus that the practice is
professionally unacceptable.328
One might question the efficacy of prohibiting lawyers from
negotiating settlement terms that are not illegal for their
•• 329
clients. Barring lawyers from negotiating noncooperation
clauses would be an exercise in futility if it causes parties to
bypass their lawyers and negotiate such agreements on their
own. While one can imagine the possibility that a plaintiff or
defendant, upon being told by her lawyer that legal ethics rules
prohibit the lawyer's involvement in a noncooperation
agreement, might enter into direct discussions with the opposing
party and conclude the settlement without further legal
assistance,33 ° this seems unlikely. Litigation tends to be
acrimonious, and both plaintiffs and defendants are prone to
view their opponents as unpleasant, unreasonable, and difficult
to deal with. The vast majority of clients will be reluctant to
forgo the filter of having their negotiations conducted by a
representative, and nervous about the traps they may fall into if
325 See supra note 252.
326 See Zacharias, supra note 320, at 1348 (noting that "[t]o the extent that the
prohibitive rules are enforced... , lawyers have reason to obey [them]," even when
they are in tension with a client-centered ethos).
327 S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-20 (1993), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 240, 257.
328 See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 749-50 (2002).
329 See supra text accompanying notes 79-84 and infra Appendix (explaining why
noncooperation agreements generally will not violate criminal statutes).
330 David Luban has criticized Richard Zitrin's proposed ethics rule that would
prohibit lawyers from negotiating secret settlements involving public safety risks on
the ground that it would lead clients to do an end run around their lawyers and
agree to secrecy on their own. See Luban, supra note 72, at 128.
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they try to conclude an agreement without legal counsel.331 A
party could also seek out a new lawyer who takes a different
view of the ethical issue, but the financial cost, delay, and
emotional toll of dismissing counsel and hiring a new one make
332it unlikely that many clients will take this step. Moreover,
many plaintiffs start out with a strong desire to help others
harmed by a defendant's wrongful conduct, and have significant
qualms about settlement terms that make it harder for others to
bring claims. Being informed that a defendant's noncooperation
demand is prohibited under lawyer's ethics rules can serve a
reinforcing function for such clients, strengthening their
commitment to resist when faced with a settlement offer.333
Nor is it likely that prohibiting lawyer participation in
noncooperation agreements will prevent cases from settling.
There is no evidence that settlements have been chilled in the
334
states that have enacted statutes or court rules limiting secrecy.
33.1 Luban raises the further objection that accountants could negotiate the
banned secrecy terms on behalf of their clients, and would escape liability for
unauthorized practice of law on the theory that conduct prohibited to lawyers
cannot be part of the practice of law. See id. This strikes me as implausible. The
function of negotiating an agreement resolving a client's legal dispute is likely to be
viewed by courts as a quintessential aspect of the practice of law inseparable from
the giving of legal advice and the exercise of legal skills, even if it involves a
settlement term prohibited under lawyers' ethics rules.
332 See Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules
Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455,497 (2006).
333 See supra note 60. A retainer agreement that informs the client, at the outset
of the representation, that the lawyer cannot negotiate a settlement involving
noncooperation, and will have to withdraw if the client insists on doing so, can
enhance the likelihood that the client will not waver when faced with a settlement
offer. Ethics committees have found that engagement agreements that prohibit a
client from accepting a settlement with terms that the lawyer deems unacceptable
(including retainers that preclude confidential settlements) are impermissible under
Model Rule 1.2, because they interfere with the client's right to decide whether to
settle. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., op. 289 (1999); see also Newman,
supra note 47, at 374. But see L.A. County Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility and
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 505 (2000) (finding no ethical bar to an engagement
agreement that provides that a client who accepts secrecy terms in a settlement will
be required to pay the lawyer's full hourly fee instead of the reduced rate otherwise
offered). There can be no serious objection, however, to an agreement that
explains what the ethics rules require of the lawyer, and obtains the client's
commitment to allow the lawyer to act in conformity with the rules. See N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 805 (2007) (stating that a retainer
agreement that accurately describes circumstances in which a lawyer is permitted to
withdraw is ethically permissible).
334 See David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice
Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217,
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The unavailability of noncooperation clauses should have little
impact on defendants' willingness to settle or the size of
settlement offers, especially when the types of secrecy most
valuable to defendants-keeping the monetary amount
confidential and prohibiting statements to the media-are still
allowed. Defendants will have ample incentive to settle to avoid
the financial exposure and greater publicity that would result
from a trial.335
Prohibiting lawyers from assisting in conduct that clients can
engage in themselves without violating the law may also be
objected to from the standpoint of client autonomy. Stephen
Pepper has argued that making the law accessible to individuals
so that they can pursue their goals constitutes an important
social good, and that it is destructive of individual autonomy,
diversity, and equality for lawyers to impose their moral values
on clients in situations where the conduct has not been
determined by society to be intolerable and made explicitly
336
unlawful. But it is only in a very weak sense that
noncooperation agreements can be said to be "lawful."
Numerous courts have declared them to be contrary to public
337policy and refused to enforce them. Even if parties violate no
positive command of law by entering into noncooperation
agreements, a public institution has determined that such
agreements inflict serious harm on the justice system. By virtue
1225 & n.18; Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement
Restrictions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 101, 110-14 (2006);
cf Ramsey et al., supra note 60 (reporting that a plaintiff's firm that stopped
agreeing to secret settlements has not encountered any case that failed to settle or
settled for less as a result).
335 See Dillard v. Starcon Int'l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 505-06 (7th Cir. 2007)
(describing settlement negotiation in which, after plaintiff refused to accept a
nonassistance clause that the defendant had insisted on including, defendant sought
to enforce oral settlemeit agreement without it); Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 95-
96 (discussing why even a total ban on confidentiality provisions is unlikely to be a
major deterrent to settlement).
336 Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615-19. The
"equality" portion of the critique, which argues that it is unjustifiable "[f]or access
to the law to be filtered unequally through the disparate moral views of each
individual's lawyer," id. at 618, would not be applicable to a rule that obliges all
lawyers to refrain from participating in certain conduct.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 185-203; see also supra text accompanying
notes 112-23, 171-84, 253-57 (discussing judicial articulations of policies disfavoring
noncooperation in other decisional contexts).
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of their role as officers of the court, lawyers have a "special
responsibility for the quality of justice., 338  There is nothing
incongruous or objectionably paternalistic in requiring lawyers
to refuse to participate in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, regardless of whether such conduct is
illegal when engaged in by clients who do not share the lawyer's
special role.339
To those who favor greater moral activism by lawyers, my
reading of the ethics rules may be criticized on the grounds that
it leaves untouched the most objectionable sorts of secret
settlements-those that hide safety dangers and information
about unlawful conduct from the public. 340 But my concern in
this Article is with the constraints on settlement secrecy that can
be derived from the rules as they are. The Model Rules, even
after the Ethics 2000 expansion of the public-regarding
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, provide very limited
scope of action for placing societal or third-party interests over
those of the client.34  For better or worse, the tenor of the
lawyers' ethics codes is that lawyers generally are not barred
from assisting clients in conduct that is harmful to third parties
or socially undesirable, unless legislatures or the courts have
prohibited the behavior. But the existing system of professional
regulation does recognize the need for lawyers to legislate for
themselves restraints on advocacy that are designed to preserve
the proper functioning of the adversary system.
This Article has focused attention on one such duty, the
obligation not to impede other parties' access to relevant
evidence by inducing witnesses to withhold cooperation. The
principle has a long pedigree and is firmly rooted in the ethics
338 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2008).
339 Many of the "officer of the court" duties that the ethics rules impose on
lawyers involve conduct that is not illegal if engaged in by an unrepresented party.
See, e.g., id. R. 3.3(a)(2) (obligation to disclose controlling legal authority to the
court); R. 3.3(d) (requiring disclosure of all material facts in ex parte proceedings);
R. 3.4(e) (placing limitations on trial statements); R. 3.6(a) (limiting extrajudicial
statements).
340 However, requiring lawyer-negotiated settlement agreements to permit
disclosure of information relevant to other parties' claims will have the incidental
effect, in many cases, of exposing wrongdoing and helping to prevent and remedy
public harms.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 63-78.
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codes. Too often, the duty has been ignored when lawyers settle
cases on behalf of clients.
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APPENDIX: ARE NONCOOPERATION AGREEMENTS CRIMINAL?
Obstruction of Justice
Stephen Gillers342 rests his argument that noncooperation
settlements violate federal obstruction of justice laws primarily
on § 1512(b) of Title 18, which makes it a felony to "knowingly
* . . corruptly persuade[] another person, or attempt[] to do so,
* . . with intent to ... cause or induce any person to withhold
testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from
an official proceeding., 343 An "official proceeding" is defined in
the statute to include any proceeding before a federal court or
agency, which "need not be pending or about to be instituted at
the time of the offense., 344 Relying on the broad construction
that a number of courts of appeal have given to the word
"corruptly," Professor Gillers concludes that offering a financial
reward to secure a person's pledge to not voluntarily provide
information to the government or private parties in pending or
future federal proceedings violates the statute's terms.345 He also
relies on two other criminal statutes that apply when there is an
already-pending federal proceeding. Section 1503(a) of Title 18
makes it a crime when any person "corruptly . . . influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice" in pending federal
judicial proceedings.346 Section 1505 contains similar language
342 Gillers, supra note 10.
343 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) (2008).
344 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(f)(1), 1515(a)(1) (2008). The Supreme Court, however, has
read the statute to require that the defendant act "in contemplation [of a] particular
official proceeding in which those documents [or testimony] might be material."
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
345 See Gillers, supra note 10, at 7-13. Some circuits have held that the "corrupt
persuasion" element is satisfied if the defendant acted with an "improper purpose"
and have suggested that a request that a witness withhold testimony, without more,
can satisfy this standard. See id. at 11-12. Other circuits have held or suggested
that the statute requires proof that the defendant's efforts were aimed at persuading
a witness to violate a legal duty to provide information. See id. at 8; see also Jeremy
McLaughlin & Joshua M. Nahum, Obstruction of Justice, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 793,
815 & n.133 (2007).
346 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2008). The Supreme Court has read into the statute a
requirement that there be a pending case in federal court, of which the defendant
has knowledge or is chargeable with notice. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S.
197, 207 (1893) (construing a virtually identical predecessor statute).
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and covers pending proceedings before federal agencies and
C347Congress.
Gillers's conclusion that these statutes reach noncooperation
agreements that forbid voluntary disclosures to other parties in a
current or future proceeding (rather than just those agreements
that would block disclosure to the court or agency presiding over
a proceeding) is hard to square with the statutory language and
the Supreme Court's interpretations of the obstruction laws.
Section 1512(b) speaks in terms of withholding information
"from an official proceeding."' 348 Section 1503(a), which includes
no such limiting language, has nonetheless been read by the
Supreme Court to require a showing of a probable impact on
specific judicial proceedings. In United States v. Aguilar,34  the
Court, emphasizing the need for "restraint in assessing the reach
of a federal criminal statute, '' 3'0 held that a defendant who made
false statements to investigating FBI agents, with knowledge that
a grand jury proceeding was pending, could not be found guilty
of obstruction in the absence of proof that he knew that his false
statements would actually be conveyed to the grand jury and be
likely to affect its proceedings.3
It is extremely unlikely that entering into a noncooperation
settlement that prohibits voluntary disclosures to other litigants,
while allowing disclosure in response to a subpoena or court
order, could constitute obstruction under Aguilar. Forcing an
opposing party to resort to formal discovery processes in order
to obtain information does not render the evidence unavailable
347 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2008) ("Whoever corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or
impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper
administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before
any department or agency of the United States" or in a congressional inquiry
commits a felony.).
348 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) (2008).
349 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
350 Id. at 600.
351 The government's theory was that the defendant knew and hoped that his
false statements would be conveyed to the grand jury through the agents' testimony,
and therefore made the statements with an intent to thwart the grand jury
investigation. Id. The Court held that "uttering false statements to an investigating
agent ... who might or might not testify before a grand jury" is insufficient and that
the government must prove "that respondent knew that his false statement would
be provided to the grand jury" in order to establish the "nexus" required by the
statute: proof that the defendant's action had the "natural and probable effect" of
interfering with the tribunal's administration of justice. Id. at 600-01.
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to a tribunal or have the probable effect of ensuring that the
352information will never be presented in court.
A stronger case can be made that settlements that prohibit
voluntary cooperation with a federal agency in connection with a
pending agency proceeding constitutes obstruction under §
1505. 3 53  In federal administrative proceedings, obtaining
testimony or documents from an unwilling witness generally
requires having the agency follow specified procedures for
issuing an administrative subpoena, and obtaining enforcement
of the subpoena may require the agency to go to court.354 Here
the costs of a noncooperation clause are borne by the agency
itself (not merely other parties to the proceeding), and thus
might be said to impede the agency's "due and proper
administration of the law.,
355
The Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Arthur Andersen LLP
v. United States356 also makes it doubtful that a defendant who
seeks a noncooperation clause can be found to have engaged in
"knowingly corrupt" conduct, one of the requisites of criminal
352 Efforts to conceal or destroy information requested in discovery might well be
found, consistent with Aguilar, to violate the obstruction statutes, since such
conduct presents a high likelihood of affecting the evidence presented in court. See
United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to
dismiss indictment against two former Texaco officials under § 1503(a) for willfully
destroying documents that had been requested at a deposition in an employment
discrimination class action). As I argue elsewhere in this Article, noncooperation
settlements that deprive other litigants of the ability to obtain evidence through
informal investigation impose significant costs, impair the proper functioning of the
adversary system, and may prevent meritorious suits from being brought. The point
here, however, is that Aguilar requires more to make out a criminal violation. The
Supreme Court found no violation in conduct that made it harder for the United
States, the prosecuting party, to obtain information that it could have presented in
court.
353 At least in those circuits that take a broad view of what constitutes a "corrupt"
motivation. See supra note 345.
354 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (2008) (EEOC regulations on issuance and
enforcement of subpoenas); see also supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
355 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2008). A request that a witness not cooperate with a federal
agency in a pending or anticipated proceeding would also be an attempt to induce a
person to "withhold testimony... from an official proceeding" within the meaning
of § 1512(b). 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) (2008). However, for reasons' discussed in
the next paragraph, it is unlikely that liability could be established under that
section's more stringent culpability standard.
356 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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liability under § 1512(b). 7 In overturning the accounting firm's
conviction for urging employees to destroy documents in
accordance with the firm's document retention policies, so that
they would be unavailable in anticipated Enron-related lawsuits,
the Court read the statutory language to mean that the violator
must be "conscious of wrongdoing., 358 The Court noted that the
use of corporate document retention policies "to keep certain
information from getting into the hands of others, including the
Government" is routine and not inherently malign.359 Under this
reasoning, it would be difficult to establish that a defendant who
sought a noncooperation clause had the requisite knowledge of
wrongfulness, considering the widespread use of such
agreements and the fact that no court has squarely held that they
violate any criminal statute.
Noncooperation agreements that fail to include an exception
allowing for disclosure in response to a lawful subpoena or court
order do run a high risk of violating federal obstruction of justice
laws. It can be reasonably assumed that most people are aware
that refusing to comply with judicial process, or paying another
to do so, is wrongful conduct. 36°  In addition, separate
subsections of the obstruction statute specifically make it a crime
to cause or induce any person to evade or flout legal process.36'
Witness Tampering
The state law equivalent to the federal provisions that Gillers
considered are witness tampering statutes, which are typically
patterned on section 241.6 of the Model Penal Code. The crime
of witness tampering is there defined to include situations where
a person, "believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, . . . attempts to induce or
357 The "knowingly" requirement is omitted from §§ 1503(a) and 1515, which
require only a showing that the defendant "corruptly" engaged in the conduct in
question. See supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
358 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 704-06.
359 Id. at 703-04.
360 See Cohen & Strauss, supra note 36 (concluding that agreements that purport
to require a witness to disobey a subpoena or court order are impermissible);
EEOC v. Severn Trent Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d 438, 442-43 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.)
(stating in dicta that an effort to use a confidentiality clause in a settlement
agreement to block compliance with a subpoena would be obstruction of justice).
361 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(C)-(D) (2008); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
241.6(1)(c)-(d) (1962) (containing similar provisions).
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otherwise cause a witness or informant to .. .withhold any
testimony, information, document or thing., 362  The reach of
witness tampering laws is significantly limited by the "pending or
about to be instituted" qualification. In many, probably most,
situations where defendants seek noncooperation clauses, they
act out of concern that similar lawsuits may be filed in the future
but without specific knowledge of another case that is pending or
imminent. In addition, the statutory language appears to
contemplate a withholding of information from the official
proceeding or investigation. While attempts to stop a person
from voluntarily testifying in court or providing information to
an investigating government agency can easily be construed as
witness tampering,363 it seems unlikely that the offense extends
to efforts to induce a person to refrain from making voluntary
disclosures to private litigants or their lawyers. The interpretive
principle that ambiguities in criminal statutes are to be construed
in favor of the defendant would support the narrower reading.
Compounding
The crime of compounding, the basis for Susan Koniak's
364
and John Freeman S365 arguments that much settlement secrecy is
illegal, is defined in the Model Penal Code as follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he accepts or agrees to
accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining
from reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission
or suspected commission of any offense or information relating
to an offense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under
this Section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an
amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or
indemnification for harm caused by the offense.
366
362 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.6(1)(b) (1962).
363 The Model Penal Code's commentary makes clear that the offense reaches
efforts to induce a witness to withhold cooperation, even if the witness is not legally
obliged to produce the information. "One is liable for efforts to cause an informant
to maintain silence even though there is no legal obligation to inform. Similarly,
one who bribes a witness to invoke the fifth amendment is guilty of tampering even
if that witness is entitled to refuse to testify." MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.6 cmt. 2
(1980).
364 Koniak, supra note 13.
365 Freeman, supra note 13.
366 MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (1962). There is no federal compounding
statute, but two federal crimes are somewhat analogous. The misprision of felony
statute applies to a person who has knowledge of the commission of a federal felony
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The information covered by secrecy clauses in settlements of
civil lawsuits often relates to conduct that violates criminalI!367
statutes as well. The crime of compounding, however, applies
only when the paid-for promise is to refrain from reporting to
law enforcement authorities and does not reach agreements that
368bar disclosures to civil litigants. Moreover, the Model Penal
Code's affirmative defense is easy to establish for the vast
majority of civil settlements, because the consideration paid for a
secrecy clause, and even the total amount of the settlement, will
generally be less than the amount of compensatory damages that
the plaintiff sought in the lawsuit or demand letter. 369  The
common law crime of compounding, however, recognized no
affirmative offense, and in states with compounding statutes that
track the common law rather than the Model Penal Code,
noncooperation agreements that are drafted broadly enough to
prohibit voluntary disclosures to law enforcement agencies
and "conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge
or other person in civil or military authority under the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 4
(2008). Most courts construing the statute have interpreted it to require more than
just a failure to notify the authorities; there must be some positive act designed to
conceal the offense from the authorities. See, e.g., United States v. Davila, 698 F.2d
715, 717 (5th Cir. 1983). That element may be satisfied by a refusal to testify in
violation of a valid court order, see United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 969 (2d Cir.
1996), but it is unclear whether an agreement to refrain from voluntarily reporting
the offense to the authorities would suffice.
The federal obstruction of criminal investigations statute prohibits "willfully
endeavor[ing] by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication
of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by
any person to a [federal] criminal investigator." 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a). Unlike
compounding, the payor, rather than the payee, is the offender. Some courts have
found that the statute applies only if a specific federal criminal investigation is
under way or is being contemplated by the authorities at the time the payment is
made. See, e.g., United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 21 (2d Cir. 1983).
367 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 840-41.
368 The same is true of the federal misprision of felony and obstruction of
criminal investigations statutes. See supra note 366.
369 Some settlements exceed any amount that the plaintiff could plausibly claim
as restitution, either because secrecy is particularly valuable to the defendant or the
defendant fears a large punitive damage award. An example of a settlement that
would likely violate the Model Penal Code's compounding provision, assuming that
the suppressed information related to criminal conduct by the defendant, is the one
in the heart valve case described by Zitrin and Langford. See supra text
accompanying notes 53-57.
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about conduct that constitutes a criminal offense very likely are
criminal.37°
In sum, parties negotiating noncooperation settlements need
to pay careful attention to potentially applicable federal and
state criminal laws. In most jurisdictions, however, an attorney
could reasonably reach the conclusion, and advise her client, that
the risk of criminal liability for a carefully drafted
noncooperation agreement is negligible. Some guideposts for
minimizing the risk of a criminal violation would be to draft the
agreement to permit disclosures in response to a subpoena or
court order or as otherwise required by law; allow voluntary
disclosures to the relevant court or agency if an official
proceeding is known to be pending or imminent; and, if a
compounding statute applies, ensure either that the settlement
satisfies the criteria for an affirmative defense or that disclosures
to law enforcement authorities are permitted.
370 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 cmt. 6 (1980) (discussing the elements of
common law compounding); Freeman, supra note 13, at 835-36. At least ten states
have compounding laws that contain no affirmative defense for settlement. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-107 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-90 (2007); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/32-1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3807 (2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.149 (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 575.020 (West
2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-6 (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 543,
544 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-370 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8
(1998); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 (West 1999) (exception only for "cases
provided for by law, in which crimes may be compromised by leave of court"). The
federal obstruction of criminal investigations statute, discussed supra note 366, also
contains no defense for money paid as part of a settlement.
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